Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

60Chapter 2can reasonably reject, the less clear is the boundary separating thetask of philosophically justifying principles of justice, on the onehand, from a particular community's enterprise of reaching apolitical self-understanding about the normative basis of its commonlife, on the other. In the latter process, which would have tooccur in the political forum of a given democratic society, thephilosopher's proposed explications can have at most a catalyzingor clarifying function.A second concept relevant in this context, that of the "overlappingconsensus," was initially afflicted with a similar ambiguity.Later, however, Rawls recognized he had to separate the first stageof philosophical justification more clearly from the second stage,which has to do with the issue of acceptance: "In the second stagethe idea of an overlapping consensus is introduced to explain how,given the plurality of conflicting comprehensive religious, philosophical,and moral doctrines always found in a democratic society... free institutions may gain the allegiance needed to endure overtime."27 Admittedly, this text also provides support for competinginterpretations. One is not quite sure whether Rawls only intendsto deal at a deeper level with a question already treated in the Theoryof justice, that is, how a just society can stabilize itself in view of the. de facto pluralism ofworldviews. Or is the concept of"overlappingconsensus" intended rather to answer the question of how one can,in the present circumstances of a democratic society, see to it thatthe theory finds the measure of well-considered acceptance necessaryfor a reformist improvement of existing institutions in light ofthe theory? In the following, I assume the second reading.In a pluralistic society, the theory of justice can expect to beaccepted by citizens only if it limits itself to a conception that ispostmetaphysical in the strict sense, that is, only if it avoids takingsides in the contest of competing forms of life and worldviews. Inmany theoretical questions, and all the more so in practical questions,the public use of reason does not lead to a rationallymotivated agreement (Einverstiindnis) . The grounds for this lie inthe "burdens of reason," burdens that the ideal character of claimsto reason impose on finite minds. This is true even for scientificdiscourses. In practical discourses there is the added factor thatquestions of the good life, even under ideal conditions, can find