Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

484Appendix Inorms in the language of law, are regarded in the language ofadministrative power as rationalizations appended to decisionsthat were previously induced. Naturally, because of its juridicalcharacter, political power still depends on normative reasons.Normative reasons thus constitute the means by which communicativepower makes itself felt. The indirect measures by which theadministration manages the economy illustrate how influence canbe brought to bear on self-regulating mechanisms (e.g., "help toself-help"). Perhaps we can apply this model to the relation betweenthe democratic public sphere and the administration. Communicativelygenerated legitimate power can have an effect on thepolitical system insofar as it assumes responsibility for the pool ofreasons from which administrative decisions must draw their rationalizations.If the normative arguments appended by the systemhave been discursively invalidated by coun terargumen ts from priorpolitical communication, then it is simply not the case that "anythinggoes," that is, anything feasible for the political system.The next question concerns the possibility of democratizingopinion- and will-formation themselves. Normative reasons canachieve an indirect steering effect only to the extent that thepolitical system does not, for its part, steer the very production ofthese reasons. Now, democratic procedures are meant to institutionalizethe forms of communication necessary for a rational willformation.From this standpoint, at least, the institutional frameworkin which the legitimation process occurs today can be submitted tocritical evaluation. With some institutional imagination, moreover,one can think of how existing parliamentary bodies might besupplemented by institutions that would allow affected clients andthe legal public sphere to exert a stronger pressure for legitimationon the executive and judicial branches. The more difficult problem,however, is how to ensure the autonomy of the opinion- andwill-formation that have already been institutionalized. Mter all,these generate communicative power only to the extent thatmajority decisions satisfy the conditions stated by Frobel, that is,only insofar as they come about discursively.The assumed internal relation between political will-formationand opinion-formation can secure the expected rationality ofdecision making only if parliamentary deliberations do not pro-