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Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

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461Postscript5Law is not a narcissistically self-enclosed system, but is nourished bythe "democratic Sittlichkeit" of enfranchised citizens <strong>and</strong> a liberalpolitical culture that meets it halfway.17 This becomes clear whenone attempts <strong>to</strong> explain the paradoxical fact that legitimate law canarise from mere legality. The democratic procedure oflawmakingrelies on citizens' making use of their communicative <strong>and</strong> participa<strong>to</strong>ryrights also with an orientation <strong>to</strong>ward the common good, anattitude that can indeed be politically called for but not legallycompelled. Like all individual rights, the form of political rights isalso such that they merely grant spheres for free choice <strong>and</strong> onlymake legal behavior in<strong>to</strong> a duty. Despite this structure, however,they can open up the sources oflegitimation in discursive opinion<strong>and</strong>will-formation only if citizens do not exclusively use theircommunicative liberties like individual liberties in the pursuit ofpersonal interests, but rather use them as communicative libertiesfor the purpose of a "public use of reason." Law can be preservedas legitimate only if enfranchised citizens switch from the role ofprivate legal subjects <strong>and</strong> take the perspective of participants whoare engaged in the process of reaching underst<strong>and</strong>ing about therules for their life in common. To this extent, constitutionaldemocracy depends on the motivations of a population accus<strong>to</strong>med<strong>to</strong> liberty, motivations that cannot be generated by administrativemeasures. This explains why, in the proceduralist paradigm oflaw,the structures of a vibrant civil society <strong>and</strong> an unsubverted politicalpublic sphere must bear a good portion of the normative expectations,especially the burden of a normatively expected democraticgenesis of law.Not surprisingly, this brings out the skeptic in both the socialscientist <strong>and</strong> the legal scholar. As an empiricist, the former teachesus about powerless ideas that always look foolish in the face ofinterests; as a pragmatist, the latter teaches us about the hardenedconflicts that can be dealt with only by calling on the backing of asubstantial state power. It is precisely the discourse-theoretic approachthat introduces a realistic element insofar as it shifts theconditions for a rational political opinion- <strong>and</strong> will-formation fromthe level of individual or group motivations <strong>and</strong> decisions <strong>to</strong> thesocial level of institutionalized processes of deliberation <strong>and</strong> deci-

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