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Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

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159A Reconstructive Approach <strong>to</strong> Law IIlegitimately expect of one another. As soon as the codes oflaw <strong>and</strong>power are set up, deliberation <strong>and</strong> decision making take on thedifferentiated form of political opinion- <strong>and</strong> will-formation. On theone h<strong>and</strong>, the collectivity that deliberates <strong>and</strong> decides separatesfrom those parts or agencies that act for it, that is, that can apply <strong>and</strong>carry out approved programs. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the collectivitycomposed of members of society transforms itself in<strong>to</strong> one composedof legal consociates who, as enfranchised citizens, exercisetheir au<strong>to</strong>nomy within a system of rights in need of interpretation<strong>and</strong> elaboration. Law not only confers a certain form on conflictregulatingnorms; it also imposes certain limits on the realizationof collective goals. The programs translated in<strong>to</strong> the language oflaw have either themselves the form of statu<strong>to</strong>ry law (if necessary,they can also take the form of special legislation <strong>and</strong> private bills orvarious regula<strong>to</strong>ry directives), or they link up with existing law. Indeliberations over policies <strong>and</strong> laws, the basic question "Wha<strong>to</strong>ught we <strong>to</strong> do?" is differentiated according <strong>to</strong> the kind of materialin need of regulation. The meaning of "ought" remains unspecifiedas long as the relevant problem <strong>and</strong> the aspect under which itcan be solved are undetermined. I want <strong>to</strong> specify these aspectsalong the lines of pragmatic, ethical, <strong>and</strong> moral issues. The st<strong>and</strong>pointsof expediency, goodness, <strong>and</strong> justice each define a differentuse of practical reason. These correspond <strong>to</strong> different types ofdiscourse, which I can only outline in broad strokes here.27Pragmatic questions pose themselves from the perspective of anac<strong>to</strong>r seeking suitable means for realizing goals <strong>and</strong> preferencesthat are already given. The goals themselves can also becomeproblematic. In that case, the issue is no longer simply that ofrationally selecting means but one of weighing goals rationally inthe light of accepted value preferences. Even here the ac<strong>to</strong>r's willis still fixed by interests or value orientations, remaining open <strong>to</strong>further determinations only with regard <strong>to</strong> alternative means orgoals. The rationally justified choice of techniques or strategies ofaction calls for comparisons <strong>and</strong> weighings that the ac<strong>to</strong>r, supportedby observations <strong>and</strong> prognoses, can carry out from thest<strong>and</strong>point of efficiency or other decision rules. The value-orientedweighing of goals <strong>and</strong> the purposive-rational choice of means lead<strong>to</strong> hypothetical recommendations that in terre late perceived causes

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