13.07.2015 Views

Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

311Deliberative Politicsneutral ground, with the hope either of resolving the dispute or ofbypassing it.4Once an ethical disagreement is uncovered, "neutral dialogue"requires a transition <strong>to</strong> that higher level of abstraction characteristicofjustice discourses, where participants examine what lies in theequal interest of all concerned. In Larmore's approach, this transitionappears as a special case of a more general postulate ofrational discourse. :15In response <strong>to</strong> this proposal, the communitarian objection canbe radicalized still further. Even if the neutrality principle could betraced back <strong>to</strong> a universal rule of argumentation, it is objected, thereconstruction of such rules must rely on the intuitive knowledgeof individual participants in rational discourse, normally our own ·knowledge. The reason is that the conditions for the discursivevindication of a validity claim, which are always already implicitlyknown, can be reflexively grasped only from the participant perspective.But this method for the rational reconstruction of intuitiveknowledge can have the consequence "that when individuals'conceptions of the good life conflict, they often will also havesomewhat different notions of the ideal conditions under whichthey believe they could justifY their conception <strong>to</strong> others. "36 Larmoresuspects that even universal grammatical knowledge is <strong>to</strong> a certainextent interwoven with a particular linguistic on<strong>to</strong>logy or with theindividual's self-underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> worldview. Even if one grantsthis, however, the worst one should expect is that the explication ofour antecedently acquired practical knowledge will exhibit perspectivaldis<strong>to</strong>rtions. One need not expect that this knowledgeitself, which is always already intuitively employed, will take as manydiverse forms as there are perspectives. The ever fallible <strong>and</strong>possibly even false reconstruction does not <strong>to</strong>uch the always alreadyfunctioning knowledgeY For this reason, we may assume that theknow-how informing argumentative practices represents a point ofconvergence where participants, however diverse their backgrounds,can at least intuitively meet in their efforts <strong>to</strong> reach an underst<strong>and</strong>ing.In all languages <strong>and</strong> in every language community, suchconcepts as truth, rationality,justification, <strong>and</strong> consensus, even ifinterpreted differently <strong>and</strong> applied according <strong>to</strong> different criteria,play the same grammatical role.38 At any rate, this is true for modern----;-

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!