Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

339Civil Society and the Political Public Spherecriteria of credibility."22 With "criteria of validity," a new kind ofcommunication and action coordination comes into play. Whereasparties can agree to a negotiated compromise for different reasons,the consensus brought about through argument must rest onidentical reasons able to convince the parties in the same way. Theconsensus-generating force of such reasons is displayed in the ideaof impartiality that governs practical discourses. 23This step necessitates a revision of the first revision. With the ideaof the impartial assessment of interest positions and action conflicts,those norms previously considered irrational are partlydrawn into the vortex of argumentation. If Elster wants an additionalmechanism of action coordination-not only the reciprocalinfluence exerted by actors oriented to success but also the communicationamong persons engaged in argument for the purposes ofreaching understanding-then he must acknowledge a rationalcore to norms and value orientations and correspondingly enlargehis concept of rationality. This he can do with the help of thedeontological concept of justice or practical reason, in the light ofwhich rights can be justified. 24 It follows that the task of politics isnot merely to eliminate inefficient and uneconomical regulationsbut also to establish and guarantee living conditions in the equalinterest of all citizens. 25With these basic conceptual revisions in place, Elster undertakesan empirical analysis of the discussions conducted in the constitutionalassemblies of Philadelphia ( 1776) and Paris ( 1789-1791).His analysis starts from the theoretically motivated distinctionbetween "bargaining" and "arguing," where argumentation includes,according to our terminology, not only justice argumentsbut also ethical-political arguments referring to the "general welfare"of the nation. Elster goes on, by way of a comparative analysisof the first two modern constitutional processes, to examine theassumption that a parliamentary opinion- and will-formation ofthis kind cannot be adequately explained on the empiricist premisesof a balance of interests steered exclusively by power. Rather,discourses and bargaining processes intertwine in such processes,though compromise formation often takes place spontaneouslyand to this extent does not satisfY the fairness conditions of regulatedbargaining.26 Elster's Storr Lectures permit two interpretations,