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541Notes to pages 225-23154. A. J. Arnaud, R. Hilpinen, and J. Wroblewski, eds., Juristische Logik undIrrationalitiit im Recht, Rechtstheorie Beiheft 8 ( 1985).55. Toulmin, Uses of Argument; Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, Introduction to Reasoning.56. K. 0. Ape!, Charles S. Peirce, trans.]. M. Krois (Amherst, Mass., 1981); see alsoK. 0. Ape!, "Sprache und Bedeutung, Wahrheit und normative Gultigkeit,"Archivo di Filosophia 55 (1987): 51-88.57. See my excursus on argumentation theory in TCA, 1:22-42.58. Aulis Aarnio begins by conceiving legitimacy, one of the two dimensions oflegal validity, as rational acceptability (The Rational as Reasonable [Boston, 1987],pp. 43ff.). He goes on to discuss various sorts of legal norms, arranging thesecategories of valid law hierarchically (pp. 6lff. and 78ff. ): these are the "sourcesofinformation." Aarnio then deals with the discourse rules that govern interpretation;these constitute the "sources of rationality." Like Dworkin, he mainlyemphasizes the externaljustification of the premises of decisions, which requires .substantial reasons, to wit, principles and policies (rightness reasons vs. goalreasons). Unlike Dworkin, however, to justify these principles Aarnio does notrequire the construction of an encompassing theory but only coherence underthe conditions of rational discourse:[T]he justification procedure is essentially a dialogue. It is a succession ofquestions and answers on the basis of which different pro and contra argumentswill be presented . ... The addressee can rationally accept the interpretation onlyif the justification results in a coherent cluster of statements and if this clusterfulfills [certain] criteria [above all criteria for the connection to valid law] . ...This is so, because the standards oflegal reasoning alone do not guarantee thecoherence of the justificatory material. All reasons must also be used in a rationalway. (Aarnio, p. 187)Good reasons display their rationally motivating force only in a forum thatgrants a hearing to all relevant voices. Aarnio describes this forum in terms ofChaim Perelman's concept of the "ideal audience." Naturally, for legal discoursea particular ideal audience limited to the boundaries of the legal communitysuffices. This audience consists of rational persons who allow the unforced forceof the better argument to determine whether they take a yes or no positionthoughonly within the context of a concrete form of life they already share.59. R. Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, trans. R. Adler and N. MacCormick(Oxford, 1989); Alexy, Theorie derjuristischenArgumentation, 2d ed. (Frankfurt amMain, 1991); Alexy refers to J. Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," which is availablein Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergiinzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativenHandelns (Frankfurt am Main, 1984) , pp. 127-83.60. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of PhilosophicalJustification," in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardtand S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 43-1 15.61. In his afterword, Alexy indeed distinguishes the rationality of established law