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521---- - - -- ---------- ------Notes to pages xxix-xxxivreceived considerable attention in the Legal Realist movement; for a historicaloverview, see William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973). Since Hart, it has been the focus of debatesinvolving the Critical Legal Studies movement; see Andrew Altman, Critical LegalStudies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).31. See the references to Michelman in note 27 above and his "Law's Republic,"Yale Law]oumal 97 (1988) : 1493-1537; Cass Sunstein, "Interest Groups" andAfter the Rights Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); JohnHart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of judicial Review (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1980); and Bruce Ackerman, We the People, vol. 1 (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1991).32. In the American jurisprudential tradition, one finds a parallel to theEuropean development of "materialized law" in the call for "sociological jurisprudence";see note 30 above. The classic liberal argument against the welfarestate is Hayek's Road to Serfdom; for a response, see Harry W.Jones, "The Rule ofLaw and the Welfare State," in Essays on Jurisprudence from the Columbia Law Review ·(NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1963) , pp. 400-413.33. His earlier critique relied more heavily on the lifeworld as the source ofresistance against bureaucratic intrusion or "colonization"; see TCA, vol. 2, chap.8; cf. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p. 20; also Amy Bartholomew, "DemocraticCitizenship, Social Rights and the 'Reflexive Continuation' of the Welfare State,"Studies in Political Economy 42 (1993) : 141-56.34. Habermas's lengthy reply to the participants in a symposium on the bookprovides still further elaboration of his central arguments and assumptions; seethe Cardozo Law Review 17/2-3 (fall 1995) . For further succinct overviews of thebook, see David M. Rasmussen, "How Is Valid Law Possible?" Philosophy and SocialCriticism 20 (1994) : 21-44; Kenneth Baynes, "Democracy and the Rechtsstaat.Remarks on Habermas's Faktizitiit und Geltung," in Stephen White, ed., TheCambridge Companion to H abermas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995),pp. 201-32; and james Bohman, "Complexity, Pluralism, and the ConstitutionalState: On Habermas's Faktizitiit und Geltung, " Law and Society Review 28 (1994) :897-930.35. For a comparative overview, see Konrad Zweigert and He in Kotz, Introductionto Comparative Law, 2d ed., trans. Tony Weir (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), vol. 1,chaps. 11-12, 16-21; for a concise introduction to the civil-law tradition ingeneral, see john Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to theLegal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America, 2d ed. (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 1985); also helpful are Norbert Horn, He in Kotz, and Hans G.Leser, German Private and Commercial Law: An Introduction, trans. Tony Weir(Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), and B. S. Markesinis, A Comparative Introduction to theGerman Law of Torts, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990). On German constitutionallaw, see Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional jurisprudence of the FederalRepublic of Germany (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989), and David P.