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Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

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246Chapter 6effect on the liberal separation of powers. Incidentally, a positivistview of law as a recursively closed system of rules is well suited forthis model.If one takes this model as the st<strong>and</strong>ard of comparison, then thematerialized legal order of the welfare state can appear as anupheaval, even as the corruption of the constitutional architec<strong>to</strong>nic.Welfare-state law does not consist primarily of clearly definedconditional programs but facilitates political policymaking <strong>and</strong>must draw on principles in the process of adjudication. Compared<strong>to</strong> the classical separation thesis, the materialization of law resultsin a "remoralization" that, by admitting arguments of moral principle<strong>and</strong> of political policy in<strong>to</strong> legal argumentation, loosens thelinear binding of the judiciary <strong>to</strong> the guidelines laid down by thepolitical legislature. The fundamental norms <strong>and</strong> principles thatnow penetrate all areas of the legal order dem<strong>and</strong> that the individualcase be interpreted constructively, in a manner sensitive <strong>to</strong>context <strong>and</strong> referring <strong>to</strong> the legal system as a whole. The contextdependenceof a norm application oriented by the whole of theconstitution can reinforce the freedom <strong>and</strong> responsibility of communicativelyacting subjects in nonformalized spheres of action.Inside the legal system, however, it signifies increased power for the. judiciary, <strong>and</strong> it enlarges the scope of judicial discretion in a waythat threatens <strong>to</strong> upset the equilibrium in the normative structureof the classical constitutional state at the cost of the citizens'au<strong>to</strong>nomy.13 That is, the orientation <strong>to</strong> fundamental norms <strong>and</strong>principles means the judiciary must turn its attention from itsformer focus on the institutional his<strong>to</strong>ry of the legal order <strong>and</strong>attend primarily <strong>to</strong> problems of the present <strong>and</strong> future. On the oneh<strong>and</strong> (as lnge borg Maus also fears), the judiciary encroaches onlegislative powers for which it lacks democratic legitimation. Onthe other h<strong>and</strong>, it promotes <strong>and</strong> confirms a flexible legal structurethat accommodates the au<strong>to</strong>nomy of the administrative apparatus-sothat the democratic legitimation oflaw is eroded from thisside as well.Attentive critics, such as Bockenforde, Denninger, <strong>and</strong> Maus,have reconstructed an implicit doctrine of basic rights from thepivotal decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court. This doctrine,so the interpretation goes, acknowledges that the system of

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