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550----· --- ---Notes to pages 306-309eliminate the distinction between deliberative forms of collective choice andforms that aggregate by non-deliberative preferences." Cohen, "Deliberation,"p. 23.23. "Inequalities of wealth, or the absence ofinstitutional measures to redress theconsequences of those inequalities, can serve to undermine the equality requiredin deliberative arenas themselves." Cohen, "Deliberation," p. 27; cf. alsoJ. Cohen and]. Rogers, On Democracy (New York, 1983), chap. 6, pp. 146ff. ; W.E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Lexington, Mass., 1974) .24. "The relevant conceptions of the common good are not comprised simply ofinterests and preferences that are antecedent to deliberation. Instead, theinterests, aims and ideals that comprise the common good are those that survivedeliberation, interests that, on public reflection, we think it legitimate to appealto in making claims on public resources." Cohen, "Deliberation," p. 23.25. Cf. Michael Walzer's treatment of integration problems created in modernsocieties by the growing mobility of marriage partners, residences, social status,and political loyalties. These "four mobilities" loosen ascriptive bonds to family,locality, social background, and political tradition. For affected individuals, thisimplies an ambiguous release from traditional living conditions that, thoughsocially integrating and providing orientation and protection, are also shaped bydependencies, prejudices, and oppression. This release is ambivalent, becauseit makes an increasing range of options available to the individual, and hence setsher free. On the one hand, this is a negative freedom that isolates the individualand compels her to pursue her own interests in a more or less purposive-rationalfashion. On the other hand, as positive freedom it also enables her to enter intonew social commitments of her own free will, to appropriate traditions critically,and to construct her own identity in a deliberate way. According to Walzer, in thelast instance only the linguistic structure of social relations prevents disintegration:"Whatever the extent of the Four Mobilities, they do not seem to move usso far apart that we can no longer talk with one another . ... Even political conflictin liberal societies rarely takes forms so extreme as to set its protagonists beyondnegotiation and compromise, procedural justice and the very possibility ofspeech." "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," Political Theory 18 (1990) :13f.26. Cf. N. Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critiqueof Actually Existing Democracy," in C. Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the PublicSphere (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), p. 134: "I shall call weak publics publics whosedeliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion formation and does not alsoencompass decision making."27. See the contributions by B. Barry et a!., "Symposium on Social justice in theLiberal State," Ethics 93 (1983): 328-90; see also S. Benhabib, "Liberal Dialogueversus a Critical Theory of Discursive Legitimation," in N. Rosenblum, ed.,Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 145ff. ;J. D. Moon,"Constrained Discourse and Public Life," Political Theory 19 (1991): 202-29.28. B. Ackerman, Social justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, Conn., 1980), p. 4: