Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

554--- --------- -----Notes to pages 335339parliamentary committees and similar institutions. Politics, with the help of itsparty organizations, suggests to the public what it should vote for and why. Andthe public exercises its influence on the administration through various channels,like interest groups and emotional appeals" [translation slightly altered.Trans.].12. Luhmann, Political Theory, p. 50 [translation slightly altered. Trans.].13. H. Willke, Ironie des Staates (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), p. 345.14. T. C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York, 1978), pp. 225f.;H. Simon, "Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations," in Models ofBounded Rationality, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 486f.15. J. Elster, "The Market and the Forum," in J. Elster and A. Hylland, eds.,Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge, 1986), p. 109.16.]. Elster, "The Possibility of Rational Politics," in D. Held, ed., Political TheoryToday (Oxford, 1991), p. 120.17. Elster, "The Market and the Forum," p. 112.18. Elster, "The Market and the Forum," p. 117: "The mere decision to engagein rational discussion does not ensure that the transactions will in fact beconducted rationally, since much depends on the structure and framework ofthe proceedings."19. On what follows, see]. Elster, The Cement of Society (Cambridge, 1989), chap. 3.20. "The former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while thebehavior of the latter is dictated by social norms. The former is 'pulled' by theprospect offuture rewards, whereas the latter is 'pushed' from behind by quasiinternalforces. The former adapts to changing circumstances . ... The latter is... sticking to the prescribed behavior even if new and apparently better optionsbecome available." Elster, Cement of Society, p. 97.21. Elster, Cement of Society, pp. 23lff.22.]. Elster, "Arguing and Bargaining in Two ConstituentA.semblies," The StorrLectures, Yale Law School, 1991, ms., pp. 37f.23. On the critical reception that game theory has given the concept ofcommunicative action, seeJ.Johnson, "Habermas on Strategic and CommunicativeAction," Political Theory 19 (1991): 181-201.24. "Given the fragility of instrumental thinking in politics, the chosen conceptionof justice cannot be a consequentialist one like utilitarianism. Rather, itmust focus on the inherent rights of individuals to equal shares in decisionmakingand in social welfare." Elster, "The Possibility ofRational Politics," p. 116.25. Elster, "The Possibility of Rational Politics," p. 120.26. In response to the obvious objection that the extraordinary design of constitutionalassemblies favors his hypothesis, Elster points to the equally unusual revolutionarysituations triggered by legitimation crises. In the latter situations, threato;-onthe part of the southern states willing to secede or on the part of the king willing tointervene-were more likely to have had a polarizing effect.