Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

68Chapter 2exists when expectations as to the behavior of others are realisticbecause of the objective probability that the others will accept theseexpectations as 'valid' for their behavior, even though no explicitagreement was made . ... Social action that rests on such likelyconsensus will be called 'consensual action' [Einverstiindnishandeln]."37 To be sure, Weber also asserts in this text that themotivations that make it possible to anticipate how others willbehave are irrelevant. But the justified supposition of a "legitimateorder" must at least be among these motivations. Moreover, thisorder rests on a value consensus to the extent that the ideas orvalues incorporated in it must be intersubjectively recognized:Only then will . .. a social relationship be called an order if the conductis, approximately or on the average, oriented toward determinable"maxims." Only then will an order be called "valid" if the orientationtoward these maxims occurs, among other reasons, also because it is insome appreciable way regarded by the actor as in some way obligatory orexemplary for him . ... An order which is adhered to from motives of pureexpediency is generally much less stable than one upheld on a purelycustomary basis through the fact that the corresponding behavior hasbecome habitual. The latter is much the most common type of subjectiveattitude. But even this type of order is in turn much less stable than anorder which enjoys the prestige ofbeing considered binding, or, as it may·be expressed, the prestige of " legitimacy. "38In legitimately regulated action, the mutually presupposed consensusis based on the fact that "along with the other motives forconformity, the order also appears to at least some of the actors asexemplary or binding and thus as something that ought to bevalid. "39 On the other hand, a legitimate order is not based solely ona normative consensus anchored intrapsychically through theinternalization of the corresponding values. To the extent that itsvalidity is not grounded through religious authority or in purelymoral terms through value-rational belief, and thus is not protectedby the corresponding internal sanctions (fear of losingreligious benefits, feelings of shame and guilt) and the capacity tobind oneself, it has need of external guarantees. In these cases theexpectation of the legitimacy of a social order is stabilized byconvention or law. As is well known, Weber speaks of"convention"in cases in which social validity is externally guaranteed by "a