13.07.2015 Views

Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

161------A Reconstructive Approach <strong>to</strong> Law II---- -- ----------------description of identity-shaping traditions is combined with thenormative projection of an exemplary way of life justified throughreflection on, <strong>and</strong> evaluation of, its formative processes. Theimperative sense of this advice can be unders<strong>to</strong>od as an "ought"that does not depend on subjective ends or preferences but stateswhich value orientations <strong>and</strong> practices are in the long run <strong>and</strong> onthe whole "good for us." Advice of this sort is grounded in ethicaldiscourses. In these, the outcome turns on arguments based on ahermeneutic explication of the self-underst<strong>and</strong>ing of our his<strong>to</strong>ricallytransmitted form of life. Such arguments weigh value decisionsin this context with a view <strong>to</strong>ward an authentic conduct oflife,a goal that is absolute for us.Up <strong>to</strong> now we have examined processes of rational political willformationunder two aspects. On the one h<strong>and</strong>, deliberative pro- ·cesses serve <strong>to</strong> specify <strong>and</strong> weigh collective goals as well as <strong>to</strong>construct <strong>and</strong> select programs <strong>and</strong> strategies suitable for achievingthese goals. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the value horizon in which thesetasks of goal attainment are posed can in turn be included in theprocess of rational will-formation inasmuch as this process involvesachieving self·underst<strong>and</strong>ing through the critical appropriation oftradition. In pragmatic discourses, we test the expediency of strategiesunder the presupposition that we know what we want. Inethical-political discourses, we reassure ourselves of a configurationo£ values under the presupposition that we do not yet knowwhat we really want. In this kind of discourse, we can justifYprograms insofar as they are expedient <strong>and</strong>, taken as a whole, goodfor us. An adequate justification o£policies <strong>and</strong> laws must, however,consider yet a further aspect, that of justice. Whether we shouldwant <strong>and</strong> accept a program also depends on whether the correspondingpractice is equally good for all. This shifts the meaning ofthe question "What ought we <strong>to</strong> do?" yet again.In moral questions, the teleological point of view from which weh<strong>and</strong>le problems through goal-oriented cooperation gives wayentirely <strong>to</strong> the normative poin<strong>to</strong>fviewfrom which we examine howwe can regulate our common life in the equal interest of all. A normis just only if all can will that it be obeyed by each in comparablesituations. Moral precepts have the semantic form o£categorical orunconditional imperatives. The imperative sense of these precepts

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!