Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

255Judiciary and Legislaturereal problem lies in the premise that assimilates legal principles tovalues. The problem is a conceptual one.Principles or higher-level norms, in the light of which othernorms can be justified, have a deontological sense, whereas valuesare teleological. Valid norms of action obligate their addresseesequally and without exception to satisfY generalized behavioralexpectations, whereas values are to be understood asintersubjectively shared preferences. Shared values express thepreferability of goods that, in specific collectivities, are consideredworth striving for and can be acquired or realized through goaldirectedaction. Norms of action appear with a binary validity claimand are either valid or invalid; we can respond to normativesentences, as we can to assertoric sentences, only by taking a yes orno position or by withholding judgment. By contrast, values setdown preference relations telling us that certain goods are moreattractive than others; hence we can assent to evaluative sentencesto a greater or lesser degree. The "oughtness" of binding norms hasthe absolute sense of an unconditioned and universal obligation;what "one ought to do" claims to be equally good for all. Theattractiveness of intersubjectively shared values has the relativesense of an estimation of goods that has become established orbeen adopted in cultures and forms oflife: serious value choices orhigher-order preferences tell us what is good for us (or for me)overall and in the long run. Different norms must not contradictone another if they claim validity for the same circle of addressees;they must fit together into a coherent complex, that is, form asystem. Different values compete for priority from case to case; tothe extent that they find intersubjective recognition within aculture or form oflife, they form flexible configurations filled withtension.Norms and values therefore differ, first, in their references toobligatory rule-following versus teleological action; second, in thebinary versus graduated coding of their validity claims; third, intheir absolute versus relative bindingness; and fourth, in thecoherence criteria that systems of norms and systems of values mustrespectively satisfY. The fact that norms and values differ in theselogical properties yields significant differences for their applicationas well.