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Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

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4Chapter 1of life are structured. This rationality is inscribed in the linguistictelos o£ mutual underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> forms an ensemble of conditionsthat both enable <strong>and</strong> limit. Whoever makes use of a naturallanguage in order <strong>to</strong> come <strong>to</strong> an underst<strong>and</strong>ing with an addresseeabout something in the world is required <strong>to</strong> take a performativeattitude <strong>and</strong> commit hersel£ <strong>to</strong> certain presuppositions. In seeking<strong>to</strong> reach an underst<strong>and</strong>ing, natural-language users must assume,among other things, that the participants pursue theirillocutionarygoals without reservations, that they tie their agreement <strong>to</strong> theintersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims, <strong>and</strong> thatthey are ready <strong>to</strong> take on the obligations resulting from consensus<strong>and</strong> relevant for further interaction. These aspects of validity thatundergird speech are also imparted <strong>to</strong> the forms oflife reproducedthrough communicative action. Communicative rationality is expressedin a decentered complex of pervasive, transcendentallyenabling structural conditions, but it is not a subjective capacitythat would tell ac<strong>to</strong>rs what they ought <strong>to</strong> do.Unlike the classical form of practical reason, communicativereason is not an immediate source of prescriptions. It has anormative content only insofar as the communicatively actingindividuals must commit themselves <strong>to</strong> pragmatic presuppositionsof a counterfactual sort. That is, they must undertake certainidealizations-for example, ascribe identical meanings <strong>to</strong> expressions,connect utterances with context-transcendingvalidity claims,<strong>and</strong> assume that addressees are accountable, that is, au<strong>to</strong>nomous<strong>and</strong> sincere with both themselves <strong>and</strong> others. Communicativelyacting individuals are thus subject <strong>to</strong> the "must" of a weak transcendentalnecessity, but this does not mean they already encounter theprescriptive "must" of a rule of action-whether the latter "must"can be traced back deon<strong>to</strong>logically <strong>to</strong> the normative validity of amoral law, axiologically <strong>to</strong> a constellation of preferred values, orempirically <strong>to</strong> the effectiveness of a technical rule. A set o£unavoidableidealizations forms the counterfactual basis of an actualpractice of reaching underst<strong>and</strong>ing, a practice that can criticallyturn against its own results <strong>and</strong> thus transcend itself. Thus thetension between idea <strong>and</strong> reality breaks in<strong>to</strong> the very facticity oflinguistically structured forms of life. Everyday communicativepractice overtaxes itself with its idealizing presuppositions, but only

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