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540Notes to pages 218-225foreseeable possibility of their collision we would not consider the two preceptsinvalid. We would be astonished if a discourse on the validity of one of thesenorms led to the opposite result." [Translation altered; for the German, seeGunther, "Ein normativer Be griff der Koharenz fur eine Theorie der juris tisch enArgumentation," Rechtstheorie 20 (1989) : 168. Trans.] See also J. Habermas,Justification and Application, trans. C. P. Cronin (Cambridge, Mass., 1993) , pp.35ff.38. Gunther, "Ein normativer Be griff," p. 175. [For a partial English translation,see his "Normative Conception of Coherence," p. 160. Trans.]39. K. Gunther, "Universalistische Normbegrundungund Normanwendung," inM. Herberger et a!., eds., Generalisierung und Individualisierung im Rechtsdenken,Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 45 ( 1992): 36-76.40. Gunther, Sense of Appropriateness, pp. 239-40 [translation altered. Trans.].41. G1mther, "Ein normativer Begriff, " p. 182; "A Normative Conception ofCoherence," p. 163 [trans. altered. Trans.].42. K. J. Kress, "Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's RightsThesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions," California Law Review72 (1984): 369-402.43. R. S. Summers, Lon L. Fuller (Stanford, 1984) , pp. 27ff. and 36ff.44. In this context, I disregard institutional proposals, according to which theprohibition against retroactivity in criminal law, for example, would be extendedto disadvantageous changes in the administration of justice. Cf. U. Neumann,"Ruckwirkungsverbot bei belastenden Rechtsprechungsanderungen derStrafgerich te?" Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 103 (1991): 331-56.45. Gunther, "Ein normativer Begriff, " p. 182; "Normative Conception," pp.163f. See also J. Habermas, "Der Philosoph als wahrer Rechtslehrer: RudolfWietholter," Kritische]ustiz 22 (1989): 138-56.46. Dworkin, Law's Empire, p. 264 (my emphasis).47. F. Michelman, "The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self­Government," Harvard Law Review 100 (1986): 72f.48. Dworkin, Law's Empire, p. 216.49. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 273f.; see also Gunther, Sense of Appropriateness,pp. 282ff.50. See the chapter with this title in P. Haberle, Die Verfassung des Pluralismus(Frankfurt am Main, 1980), pp. 79-105.51. Michelman, "The Supreme Court 1985 Term," p. 76; cf. K. Gunther, "Hero­Politics in Modern Legal Times," Institute for Legal Studies, series 4 (Madison,Wise., 1990).52. 0. Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation," Stanford Law Review 34 ( 1982): 739-63; here 744.53. Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation," p. 762.