13.07.2015 Views

Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

349Civil Society <strong>and</strong> the Political Public Spherethe political system. This objection would be off target only if theenvisioned change in the type of legal regulation could be keptwithin the boundaries of democracy.The more collective ac<strong>to</strong>rs, sociofunctional systems, <strong>and</strong> largeorganizations act in place of individuals, the more clearly the basisfor assigning responsibility for the consequences of actions shifts<strong>and</strong>the less it seems possible <strong>to</strong> rely on rights for safeguarding thosecollective goods of the "risk society" that are worth protecting. Forthis reason, Willke considers it obsolete <strong>to</strong> anchor law in anindividualistically designed system of rights. The "relational programs"he calls for are instead designed for the au<strong>to</strong>poietic reproduction<strong>and</strong> self-steering of systems; they no longer refer <strong>to</strong> theprivate <strong>and</strong> public au<strong>to</strong>nomy of socialized individuals. Nevertheless,such a restructuring oflawis by no means intended <strong>to</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>on ·the idea of the constitutional state but only <strong>to</strong> interpret it differently.On this premise, a formally correct legal regulation of thebargaining networks would suffice <strong>to</strong> secure their legitimacy aswell. Willke even insists thatdemocracy can be preserved in highly complex societies only if this idea[of the constitutional state] is generalized for society as a whole. Furthermore,society must be specifically constituted in a way that permits <strong>and</strong>promotes the guarantee of the au<strong>to</strong>nomy <strong>and</strong> differences of citizens asmuch as the au<strong>to</strong>nomy <strong>and</strong> differences of its functional systems. Thelatter is not just an end in itselffor the preservation of the achieved degreeof functional differentiation but in addition serves <strong>to</strong> generalize theconstitutional protection of the citizen.43In fact, this formulation reveals more than a break with just onehis<strong>to</strong>rical-indeed, his<strong>to</strong>rically obsolete-reading of constitutionaldemocracy. With the "idea of a society-wide, consensually institutionalized<strong>and</strong> binding constitution" that stretches "from its citizensas natural persons <strong>to</strong> include their organizations, corporateac<strong>to</strong>rs, <strong>and</strong> functional systems,"44 the systems-theoretic adaptationof the Hegelian Stiindestaat takes the place of the democraticconstitutional state <strong>and</strong> undermines its individualistic basis oflegitimation. This is already evident in simple examples.Neocorporatist bargaining networks can attune the growing complexityof each functional system with the others only by simultaneouslystimulating this growth; yet there is no preestablished

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!