Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

539-- ---- ----- -- -- --- -- ---------·-------Notes to pages 211-217"Dworkin's Constructive Optimism vs. Deconstructive Legal Nihilism," Law andPhilosophy 6 (1987) : 321-56.22. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 66; cf. also his Matter of Principle (Cambridge,Mass., 1985), pt. 2.23. S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, 1964) ; S. Toulmin, R. Rieke,and A. Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (New York, 1979).24. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 41, 40, resp.25. "I mean only to suppose that a particular social institution like slavery mightbe unjust, not because people think it unjust, or have conventions according towhich it is unjust . .. butjust because slavery is unjust. If there are such moral facts,then a proposition oflaw might rationally be supposed to be true even iflawyerscontinue to disagree about the proposition after all hard facts are known orstipulated." Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p. 138.26. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 120.27. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 121.28. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 119.29. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 87.30. R. M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, Mass., 1986); D.M. Trubek and ]. P. Esser, "'Critical Empiricism' and American Critical LegalStudies," in C. Joerges and D. M. Trubek, eds., Critical Legal Thought (Baden­Baden, 1989), pp. 105-56; G. Minda, "The Jurisprudential Movements of the1980s," Ohio State Law journal 50 (1989): 599-662; J. Boyle, "The Politics ofReason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought," Pennsylvania LawReview 133 (1985): 685-780.31. A. Altman, "Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin," Philosophyand Public A fa irs 15 (1986) : 202-35.32. Dworkin, Law 's Empire, p. 211.33. Dworkin, Law 's EmjJire, pp. 213f.34. D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication," Harvard LawReview 89 (1976): 1688ff.35. G. Frankenberg, "Down by Law: Irony, Seriousness, and Reason," NorthwesternUniversity Law Review 83 (1988): 360-97; here pp. 392-93.36. Dworkin, Law 's Empire, pp. 271-75.37. K. Gunther, "A Normative Conception of Coherence for a Discursive Theoryof Legal Justification," Ratio juris 2 (1989): 157: "When we recognize a norm asvalid we do not take every individual application situation into account, as canbe seen even in our ordinary use of the term 'valid.' We use this predicate evenfor those norms we know will interfere with universalizable interests at least insome cases. For example we all know (and could foresee in a discourse onvalidity) that the norm 'Do not break a promise' will collide with the norm 'Helpyour neighbor if he is in an emergency' at least in some cases . ... In spite of the