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538Notes <strong>to</strong> pages 197-2104. Cf. R. Dreier, Was ist und wozu Allgemeine Rechtstheorie ? (Tiibingen, 1975); N.MacCormick, Legal Reasoning <strong>and</strong> Legal Theory (Oxford, 1978).5.]. Wroblewski, "Legal Syllogism <strong>and</strong> Rationality ofjudicial Decision," Rechtstheorie5 (1974): 33-46.6. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 87.7. H.-G. Gadamer, Truth <strong>and</strong> Method, 2d. ed., trans. ]. Weinsheimer <strong>and</strong> D. G.Marshall (New York, 1990).8. W. Hasse mer, 'Juristische Hermeneutik," Archiv fur Rechts- und Soz.ialphilosophie72 (1986): 195ff. ; see also U. Neumann,JuristischeArgumentationslehre (Darmstadt,1986)' pp. 54ff.9.]. Esser, Grundsatz. und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatsrechts, 2nded. (Tiibingen, 1964) , p. 182; see also his Vorverstiindnis und Methodenwahl in derRechtsfindung (Kronberg, 1972).10. G. Ellscheid <strong>and</strong> W. Hassemer, eds., Interessenjurisprudenz (Darmstadt, 1974) .11. On American Legal Realism, see R. S. Summers, Instrumentalism <strong>and</strong> AmericanLegal Theory (Ithaca, 1982).12. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961), p. 107: "The rule ofrecognition exists only as a complex, but normally concordant, practice of thecourts, officials, <strong>and</strong> private persons in identifYing the law by reference <strong>to</strong> certaincriteria. Its existence is a matter of fact."13. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 182.14. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 92.15. R. Alexy, "Zur Kritikdes Rechtspositivismus," in R. Dreier, ed., Rechtspositivismusund Wertbezug des Rechts (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 9-26; for a contrasting view, see N.Hoerster, Verteidigung des Rechtspositivismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1989) .16. B. Peters, Rationalitiit, Recht und Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), pp.278f.17. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 82.18. Cf. R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Baden-Baden, 1985), pp. 75ff.; for acriticism of this view, see K. Gunther, The Sense of Appropriateness: ApplicationDiscourses in Morality <strong>and</strong> Law, trans.]. Farrell (Albany, 1993), pp. 212ff. [On theconcept of value involved in Giiterabwiigung, see chap. 6 n28. Trans.]19. ]. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy, 2 vols.(Bos<strong>to</strong>n, 1984, 1987) 1:130-36 (hereafter, TCA) ; see also ]. Habermas, On theLogic oftheSocialSciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen <strong>and</strong>]. A. Stark (Cambridge, Mass.,1988), pp. 143ff.20. R. Dworkin, Law's Empire, pp. 52f., 419 n2.21. One of the few works that relates Dworkin's concept of interpretation <strong>to</strong> theEuropean discussion, especially <strong>to</strong> the views ofGadamer, Derrida, <strong>and</strong> myself, isDavid C. Hoy's "Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical <strong>and</strong> PoststructuralistPerspectives," Southern California Law Review 58 (1985): 135-76; see also his

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