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Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

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251-Judiciary <strong>and</strong> Legislatureintersubjective meaning of securing symmetrical relations of mutualrecognition. By mutually granting one another these rights,individuals acquire the status of legal subjects who are both free<strong>and</strong> equal. This original intersubjective meaning is differentiatedaccording <strong>to</strong> "subjective" <strong>and</strong> "objective" legal contents only in viewof the problem of the juridification of political power (which,however, is from the beginning tacitly presupposed for the constitutionof the legal code). But it is only a particular paradigmaticunderst<strong>and</strong>ing of law in general that causes the objective legalcontent apparently <strong>to</strong> drop out of some basic rights. This underst<strong>and</strong>ingstems in turn from how a particular his<strong>to</strong>rical situationwas perceived through the lens of social theory, that is, a situationin which the liberal middle class had <strong>to</strong> grasp, on the basis of itsinterest position, how the principles of the constitutional statecould be realized. Viewed from the st<strong>and</strong>point of"effective his<strong>to</strong>ry"( wirkungsgeschichtlich) , the liberal paradigm of law represented atthe time a thoroughly successful solution <strong>to</strong> this problem; <strong>to</strong>day thesame problem, under the altered his<strong>to</strong>rical circumstances thateven Bockenforde recognizes, dem<strong>and</strong>s a different answer.Of course, the social-welfare paradigm oflaw that has since beenestablished is also no longer very convincing. However, the difficultiesthat Bockenforde astutely analyzes in this new paradigm are nota sufficient reason for res<strong>to</strong>ring the old one. 23 In the United States,the problems that have resulted from the welfare programs of theNew Deal, as well as from the sudden expansion of welfare claimssparked by the vision of the "Great Society" in the sixties <strong>and</strong>seventies, are openly acknowledged. This "rights revolution" istaken as a challenge <strong>to</strong> give a new interpretation <strong>to</strong> the principlesof the constitutional state in the light of new his<strong>to</strong>rical experiences.For example, the partially counterproductive effects of welfareprograms have led Cass Sunstein <strong>to</strong> conclude only that a newconsensus must develop about how American constitutional principlescan be realized under the conditions of the "regula<strong>to</strong>ry"state.As the result of an analysis of Supreme Court adjudication,Sunstein proposes a series of "background norms" that are intended<strong>to</strong> modifY the paradigmatic reading of the principles ofgovernment by law:

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