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Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

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61The Sociology of Law vs. the Philosophy of justicereasonable answers only within the horizon of a life project alreadypresupposed as valid. Now, a theory of justice tailored <strong>to</strong> modernliving conditions must reckon with a variety of equally entitled,coexisting forms of life <strong>and</strong> life plans; from the perspective ofdifferent traditions <strong>and</strong> life his<strong>to</strong>ries, disagreement over these isreasonable.28 As a result, the theory ofjustice must limit itself <strong>to</strong> thenarrow circle of political-moral questions of principle for which an"overlapping consensus" may reasonably be expected, for these areprecisely the questions that concern values included in each of thecompeting comprehensive doctrines. What one seeks are principlesor norms that incorporate generalizable interests.According <strong>to</strong> what Rawls has in mind, a postmetaphysical theoryof justice that rests on a weak, that is, merely formally defined,concept of the good represents a set of intersecting normative ·statements. In this set the more comprehensive but context-dependentinterpretations of self <strong>and</strong> world-be they ethical or evenreligious <strong>and</strong> metaphysical-"overlap." These competingworldviewsmust acknowledge the conditions of postmetaphysical thinking atleast <strong>to</strong> the extent that they give themselves over without reservation<strong>to</strong> public argumentative exchange:The hope is that, by this method of avoidance, as we might call it, existingdifferences between contending political views can at least be moderated,even if not entirely removed, so that social cooperation on the basis ofmutual respect can be maintained. Or if this is expecting <strong>to</strong>o much, thismethod may enable us <strong>to</strong> conceive how, given a desire for free <strong>and</strong>uncoerced agreement, a public underst<strong>and</strong>ing could arise consistentwith the his<strong>to</strong>rical conditions <strong>and</strong> constraints of our social world.29It is not entirely clear what Rawls has actually gained with thesereflections-<strong>and</strong> what he has not. He has certainly shown that anormative theory of justice of the sort he proposes can gain entry<strong>to</strong> a culture in which basic liberal convictions are already rootedthrough tradition <strong>and</strong> political socialization in everyday practices<strong>and</strong> in the intuitions of individual citizens. Rawls not only believesthat a milieu with this character can be found <strong>to</strong>day in the pluralistculture of the United States; he also realizes that this pluralismwould have <strong>to</strong> develop <strong>and</strong> even intensifY if the postulated principlesof justice assumed a concrete shape in the basic institutions

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