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Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

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9Law as Social Mediation between <strong>Facts</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Norms</strong>explains, on the one h<strong>and</strong>, the structure <strong>and</strong> meaning of individualrights <strong>and</strong>, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, the idealist connotations of a legalcommunity-as an association of free <strong>and</strong> equal citizens, thiscommunity determines for itself what rules should govern socialinteractions (section 1.3).1.1 Meaning <strong>and</strong> Truth: On the Immanent Tension betweenFacticity <strong>and</strong> ValidityRecasting the basic concepts of "practical reason" in terms of a"communicative rationality" has the advantage of not cutting socialtheory off from the issues <strong>and</strong> answers developed in practicalphilosophy from Aris<strong>to</strong>tle <strong>to</strong> Hegel. In fact, it is far from clear thatthe price we have <strong>to</strong> pay for the premises of postmetaphysical ·thinking must be an indifference <strong>to</strong> such questions, which in anycase continue <strong>to</strong> be felt within the lifeworld. As long as theory doesnot itself block its access <strong>to</strong> the fund of everyday intuitions available<strong>to</strong> laypersons, methodological grounds are enough <strong>to</strong> prohibit itfrom ignoring the problems that objectively impose themselves onparticipants. To be sure, practical philosophy has taken its basicquestions ("What ought I do?" or "What is good for us in the longrun <strong>and</strong> on the whole?") from everyday life in an unmediated way,treating these questions without the objectivating filter of socialscience. The renunciation of the basic concept of practical reasonsignals a break with this naive normativism. But even the successorconcept, that of communicative reason, still retains portions of theidealist heritage. In the context of an explana<strong>to</strong>ry theory, theseidealist elements are by no means an unmixed blessing.However far removed <strong>to</strong>day's concept of reason is from itsPla<strong>to</strong>nic origins, <strong>and</strong> however much it may have been changed byparadigm shifts, it is still constituted by a reference, if not <strong>to</strong> idealcontents (let alone <strong>to</strong> Ideas), then <strong>to</strong> idealizing, limit conceptions.No idealization remains satisfied with concepts that are merelymimetic adaptations <strong>to</strong> reality as given. When this operation withthe concept of communicative reason is even ascribed <strong>to</strong> socialreality itself-incorporated in it, as it were-the empiricist's suspicionsagainst any kind of confounding of reason <strong>and</strong> reality perkup. In what sense could something like communicative reason be

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