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Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

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63The Sociolo-,ry of Law vs. the Philosophy of justicefortunate heirs, should be able <strong>to</strong> recapitulate this impartial judgment.The presuppositions under which these parties make theiragreements elucidate a moral point of view that does not accrue <strong>to</strong>the privilege of a particular culture but goes deeper, in fact isultimately anchored in the symmetries of the mutual recognitionof communicatively acting subjects in general.Of course, these abstract conditions that make impartial judgmen<strong>to</strong>f practical questions possible do not coincide with the conditionsunder which we are disposed <strong>to</strong> act on moral insight. This leadsRawls <strong>to</strong> seek out the motivational thrust of an accommodatingpolitical culture, which he finds at the privileged site of a continuousconstitutional tradition that stretches back over two hundredyears. Though certainly challenged again <strong>and</strong> again by conflicts ofclass <strong>and</strong> race, this tradition has constantly been renewed <strong>and</strong>revitalized by new interpretations. If one takes this relation <strong>to</strong>tradition literally, though, the theory's politically convincing forceis limited <strong>to</strong> a few responsive contexts.This consequence leads Ronald Dworkin <strong>to</strong> look for a lesscontingent way of embedding normative theories. On no accountdoes he want the effectiveness of liberal principles <strong>to</strong> depend onlatent potentials that we can awaken from traditions we just happen<strong>to</strong> inherit. Thus in a recent article Dworkin not only expects theory<strong>to</strong> take on the burden of justification for abstract principles hangingin midair, as it were. He also sets it the task of providing theseprinciples with an ethical foundation. He opposes uncoupling apostmetaphysical concept of justice from more embracing butconcretely structured, <strong>and</strong> hence motivating, projects of a wellspentlife.In place of the deon<strong>to</strong>logical priority of the right over thegood, Dworkin wants a liberal ethicfor pluralistic societies. This ethicshould be sufficiently formal <strong>to</strong> go along with the disagreementsone can reasonably anticipate in regard <strong>to</strong> preferred life orientations,yet it should also be substantial enough <strong>to</strong> constitute amotivational base for implementing abstract liberal principles.This theory, cast as a single whole, is supposed <strong>to</strong> embed thedeon<strong>to</strong>logical concept of justice in a consonant ethic:Liberal philosophers who . .. adopt the restricted view that liberalism isa theory of the right but not the good face the problem of explaining whatreasons people have <strong>to</strong> be liberals . .. : they try <strong>to</strong> find motives people have,

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