Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

524-- ----·---·------Notes to pages 22-3514. ]. Habermas, "Edmund Husser! iiber Lebenswelt, Philosophie undWissenschaft," in Habermas, Texte und Kontexte (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), pp.34-43.15. A. Gehlen, Man, His Nature and Place in the World, trans. C. McMillan and K.Pillemer (New York, 1988); also his Urmensch und Spiitkultur (Bonn, 1956).16. Habermas, TCA, 2:49ff.17. W. Benjamin, "Der Surrealism us," in Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften II, ed. R.Tiedemann and H. Schweppenhiiuser (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), 3:295ff.18. The basic concept of communicative action explains how social integrationcan come about through the binding forces of an intersubjectively sharedlanguage. The latter imposes pragmatic constraints on subjects who want to usethe binding energies oflanguage and compels them to step out of an egocentricorientation to their own success so as to open themselves to the public criteriaof the rationality of mutual understanding. From this viewpoint, society presentsitself as a symbolically structured lifeworld that reproduces itself throughcommunicative action. Naturally, it does not follow from this that strategicinteractions could not emerge in the lifeworld. But such interactions now havea different significance than they do in Hobbes or in game theory: they areno longer conceived as the mechanism for generating an instrumental order.Rather, strategic interactions find their place in a lifeworld that has already beenconstituted elsewhere, as it were. Those who act strategically no doubt also havea lifeworld background always behind them; but this background is neutralizedin its action-coordinating force. It no longer provides a shared consensus inadvance, because strategic actors encounter normative contexts, as well as otherparticipants, only as social facts. In the objectivating attitude o£an observer, theycan no longer reach an understanding with others as second persons.19. The usual objections against the theory of communicative action fail toappreciate this theoretical assumption of permanent dissension in modernsocieties; see H.J. Giegel, introduction to Giegel, Kommunikation, pp. 7-17.20. I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of justice, pt. 1 of The Metaphysics of Morals,trans.]. Ladd (New York, 1965), p. 36.21. Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 34 [translation slightly altered. Trans.].22. Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 19 [translation slightly altered. Trans.].23. I. Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, in Kant, Ethical Philosophy, trans.]. W. Ellington (Indianapolis, 1983), p. 38.24. R. Dreier, "Recht und Moral," in Dreier, Recht-Moral-Ideologie (Frankfurt amMain, 1981), pp. 180ff, here 194ff.25. Dreier, "Recht und Moral," p. 198. Dreier uses the expression "ethical" in away that corresponds to my use o£ "moral."26. In what follows, I draw on suggestive discussions with Lutz Wingert.27. H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge, 1981).