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Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

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292Chapter 7that "the validity of . .. the norms accepted by the individual humanbeing is generated by the individual himself through his freeconsent."4 The individuals themselves are the ones who deliberatelyproduce normative validity through a free act of consent. Thisvoluntaristic underst<strong>and</strong>ing of validity corresponds <strong>to</strong> a positivistview of law: law includes everything that a duly chosen politicallawgiver posits as law, <strong>and</strong> only that. This view agrees with criticalrationalism, in the sense that modern convictions are not rationallyjustified in any sense but rather express a decision or a culturalshaping that in fact has become dominant.5If participating citizens want <strong>to</strong> make this explanation their own,then they are at first tempted <strong>to</strong> look for ways of grounding ethicalsubjectivism. They might seek this grounding in human rights, orthey might look <strong>to</strong> a deon<strong>to</strong>logical elucidation of the moral poin<strong>to</strong>f view, according <strong>to</strong> which the only valid norms are those that allcould will. But empiricism teaches them that such rationalisticescapes would lead them away from the specific insight in<strong>to</strong> theirreducible contingency of what they consider normatively valid.However, precisely this awareness of contingency renders theproffered objective explanation unsatisfac<strong>to</strong>ry for the participantsin the democratic process. They need at least a purposive-rationalexplanation for why the norms passed by the majority should beaccepted as valid by the outvoted minority.(b) On voluntaristic premises, the validity claim raised by majoritydecisions cannot be grounded by appealing <strong>to</strong> the commongood, forecasts of collective utility, or practical reason, for each ofthese would require objective st<strong>and</strong>ards. Instead, Becker explainsthe acceptance ofmority rule in terms of a domesticated strugglefor power. If one presupposes, with ethical subjectivism, that eachindividual has equal power, then a majority of votes is an impressivenumerical expression of superior strength: "If one views the matter:this way, then this justification of democratic procedures is based'on . . . the threat of the majority <strong>to</strong> revoke the agreement <strong>to</strong>•renounce violence, when things do not go according <strong>to</strong> its will . ...According <strong>to</strong> this view, democracy means nothing other than tha<strong>to</strong>ne part of the people rules the other part for a set time. "6 If oneconsiders how a threat on the part of the numerically <strong>and</strong> at leastsymbolically stronger party can, against the background of the

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