Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

XVTranslator's Introductionmunity. At least this is the case with truth claims and moral claims.As understood by participants engaged in interaction and discourse,truth claims are claims about the objective world that allhuman beings share, and moral claims have to do with norms forinterpersonal relationships that any autonomous adult should findrationally acceptable from the standpoint ofjustice and respect forpersons. If such claims are valid, then any competent speakershould, under suitable conditions, be able to accept the claim onthe basis of good reasons. When a claim is contested, actuallybringing about such rational acceptance requires actors to shiftinto a discourse in which, the pressures of action having been moreor less neutralized, they can isolate and test the disputed claimsolely on the basis of arguments.9To be sure, not all types of claims anticipate the agreement of a ·universal audience. The differences between types of discourse canbe quite important in this regard. For example, claims about whatis good for a particular group (or person), or about a particulargroup's authentic self-understanding, may be addressed only to theindividuals concerned and those who know them well. Such discourses,which Habermas labels "ethical," differ both in theme andscope of audience from the "moral" discourse concerned withuniversal norms of justice. 10 But even these more limited ethicalclaims presuppose an orientation to mutual understanding, whichfor Habermas is constitutive of communicative action. The orientationto reaching understanding about validity claims serves as amechanism for social integration inasmuch as it grounds sharedexpectations, ways of interpreting situations, and so forth.To illustrate Habermas's approach further, imagine that a disputearises within a group and that its members wish to resolve itconsensually on the basis of validity claims. According to Habermas,conflict resolution on the basis of reasoned agreement involves atleast three idealizing assumptions: members must assume theymean the same thing by the same words and expressions; they mustconsider themselves as rationally accountable; and they must supposethat, when they do arrive at a mutually acceptable resolution,the supporting arguments sufficiently justify a (defeasible) confidencethat any claims to truth, justice, and so forth that underlietheir cqnsensus will not subsequently prove false or mistaken. No