Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

152------------- --- --------Chapter 4communities that maintain themselves in their social environmentunder particular historical conditions. As a result, concrete mattersand teleological points of view migrate into law. Whereas moralrules, aiming at what lies in the equal interest of all, express auniversal will pure and simple, laws also give expression to theparticular wills of members of a particular legal community. Moreover,whereas the morally autonomous will remains in some sensevirtual because it states only what could be rationally accepted byeach, a legal community's political will, which of course shouldaccord with moral insights, also expresses an intersubjectivelyshared form of life, existing interest positions, and pragmaticallychosen ends. Political issues are such that in the medium oflaw, thenormative regulation of behavior is also open for the evaluationand pursuit of collective goals. This expands the spectrum ofreasons relevant for political will-formation: in addition to moralreasons, we find ethical and pragmatic ones. The focus therebyshifts from opinion- to will-formation.The more concrete the matter in need of regulation and themore concrete the character of legal propositions, the more theacceptability of norms also expresses the self-understanding of ahistorical form of life, the balance between competing groupinterests, and an empirically informed choice among alternativegoals. The teleological points of view that find their way into legalcontents through these volitional components become more pronouncedto the extent that a society concentrates the pursuit ofcollective goals in the state, for this also determines how much thelegislature must program the expanded policy fields and growingorganizational capacities of the state. Even in the liberal model, inwhich the pursuit of collective goals is generally moved from thegovernment (restricted to enforcing rights) over to market mechanismsand voluntary associations,1H law cannot be kept free of thepolitical aims implemented in tax legislation and military protection.At the same time, the consideration of collective goals mustnot wreck the legal form, and therewith the intrinsic function oflaw; it must not permit law to be absorbed into politics. Otherwise thetension between facticity and validity, displayed in its pure form inmodern law, would have to disappear. Legitimacy would be assimilatedto the positivity of an imitation of substantial ethical life if, as