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Between Facts and Norms - Contributions to a ... - Blogs Unpad

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69The Sociology of Law vs. the Philosophy of Justicegeneral <strong>and</strong> practically significant reaction of disapproval" <strong>to</strong>wardthe deviating behavior; he speaks of "law" if average normconformativebehavior is guaranteed by the threat of sanctionsapplied by "a staff engaged in enforcement."40 The consensus thatcan be assumed in legitimately regulated action is modified according<strong>to</strong> the kind of internal <strong>and</strong> external guarantees that are added<strong>to</strong> the legitimating reasons. Such consensus rests on an amalgam ofreasons <strong>and</strong> empirical motives, where the reasons differ according <strong>to</strong>whether they derive from mythic narratives, religious worldviews,or metaphysical doctrines, or whether they are of secular origin,springing from the pragmatic, ethical, or moral use of practicalreason.We can see the ambivalent nature of institutions reflected in thismixed validity basis of consensus, which secures social validity fora social order <strong>and</strong> therewith allows one <strong>to</strong> expect de fac<strong>to</strong> complianceon the average. Interests can be satisfied through generalizedbehavioral expectations in the long run only if interests are connectedwith ideas that justify normative validity claims; ideas can inturn gain broad empirical acceptance only if they are connectedwith interests that lend them motivational force. This yields themethodological consequence that legitimate orders can be analyzedequally "from above" <strong>and</strong> "from below"; a reconstructivesociology must do justice <strong>to</strong> both perspectives. In this way thesociological discourse of law can learn from the philosophicaldiscourse of justice <strong>and</strong> at the same time transcend the limits ofsuch normative discourse.The reconstructive analysis undertaken from the participant'sperspective of the judge or client, legisla<strong>to</strong>r or citizen, aims at thenormative self-underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the legal system, that is, at thoseideas <strong>and</strong> values by which one can explain the claim <strong>to</strong> legitimacyor the ideal validity of a legal order (or of individual norms). Theempirical analysis undertaken from the observer's perspective aimsat the <strong>to</strong>tal complex built of beliefs about legitimacy, interestpositions, sanctions, <strong>and</strong> circumstances. It thus aims at the logic ofthe situation that explains the empirical validity <strong>and</strong> de fac<strong>to</strong>acceptance oflegally institutionalized expectations. Weber draws acorresponding distinction between the legal <strong>and</strong> the sociologicalpoints of view. The first has <strong>to</strong> do with the objective meaning

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