The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

England will never give up so long as I am in power, even if England is
burned to the ground. The Government will move if it has to and take the
Fleet to Canada and fight on.’
Late that night, Kennedy reported his conversation to Washington and
the following morning, 16 May, forwarded on to the President Churchill’s
letter requesting help. The Prime Minister and President had begun a
correspondence the previous autumn, but this was the first time Churchill
had written to him since becoming PM. He did not beat about the bush.
How much Churchill himself believed in the threat of parachutists is not
clear, but he was certainly prepared to try to use it as leverage. ‘We expect
to be attacked here ourselves,’ he wrote, ‘both from the air and by parachute
and air-borne troops in the near future, and are getting ready for them.’ The
voice and power of the United States, he warned the President, would count
for nothing if withheld too long. ‘You may have a completely subjugated
Nazified Europe established with astonishing swiftness, and the weight may
be more than we can bear.’ He pleaded with Roosevelt to declare nonbelligerency
against Germany so that she might help Britain in every way
short of actually engaging armed forces.
He then provided a list of requests. In addition to the destroyers,
aircraft, AA guns and steel, he also asked that America send a naval
squadron to Ireland to try to deter a German invasion there, and offered the
US the chance to make use of Singapore in an effort to keep the ‘Japanese
dog’ quiet in the Pacific.
Later on the 16th, some hours after sending Churchill’s letter, Kennedy
cabled the President stressing his grave doubt once more that Britain could
fight on alone. ‘It is not beyond the realm of reason,’ he wrote, ‘that this
crack-up can come like a stroke of lightning. In consequence, any action
must be conceived now if it is to be effective.’ Around midnight, the
President’s reply arrived. The destroyers could not be made available
without an Act of Congress and now was not the moment to ask. As regard
to aircraft and steel, Arthur Purvis, the head of the Anglo-French
Purchasing Commission in the US, could expect continued co-operation.
Sending a naval squadron to Ireland was not impossible but the US navy
was firmly ensconced at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, so making use of
Singapore was, for the time being, out of the question.
Churchill was naturally disappointed, particularly about the destroyers,
but Roosevelt was being forced to tread carefully. In America he was seen