The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

Hitler might have been sure of its success, but this was because he had little
operational or strategic understanding. How could he? His military career
had ended on the Western Front in 1918, by which time he had risen no
higher than corporal. Over twenty years later, despite his obvious
intelligence and ability to absorb information, it was only his power and
authority, rather than any military acumen, which qualified him to be a war
chief.
Certainly many of his commanders had serious doubts, and with some
reason. The plan was for one group of armies, Army Group B, to thrust
their way across into the neutral Low Countries, drawing the French – and
British Expeditionary Force – forward to meet the threat. At the same time,
a larger force, Army Group A, spearheaded by panzer and mechanized
divisions, would burst through the dense Ardennes forests, and cross the
River Meuse. Then, having taken the French completely off guard, the
panzers would charge forward towards the coast, thus isolating the majority
of the French, British and Belgian forces in a massive encirclement. Most
of the Luftwaffe were to operate in the north, supporting Army Group B,
which in turn would help deceive the enemy into thinking it was in the
north that the main German effort was coming.
The flaw in using the Luftwaffe in such a way was that it would leave
Army Group A dangerously unprotected from the sky as it clawed its way
through the Ardennes. The number of men, vehicles, horses and carts
involved in the Ardennes thrust was staggering. Put toe to tail, the
spearhead alone had a march movement length of nearly a thousand miles.
For ten days or more, the roads passing through the Ardennes would be
clogged with traffic, the juiciest of targets for any determined Allied
bombers.
And that concern aside, the majority of the German commanders had
neither understanding of nor faith in the tactical concept being suggested –
namely that a fast, highly mobile tank force could be used to drive a farreaching
hole into the not inconsiderable French defences. To many, it
seemed that only a miracle could possibly bring them victory.
The idea of this mobile thrust through the Ardennes had been put forward
by General Erich von Manstein after considerable discussion with
Generalleutnant Heinz Guderian, a dynamic and deep-thinking soldier who