The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

In this he was correct, but already a major strategy dispute had broken
out between the Admiralty and Admiral Forbes, the C-in-C of the Home
Fleet. Admiral Pound, the First Sea Lord, was determined that not only
should imminent invasion be taken extremely seriously, but enough ships
should be available to mount a crippling attack on an invasion force before
it even set sail. To achieve this, he ordered that a strike force of four
destroyer flotillas – some thirty-six ships – with cruiser support should be
kept along the east and south-east coasts, all within the Nore Command.
This was overly cautious. As Dunkirk had proved, ships could be
moved from bases as far north as Scapa Flow to the Channel within twentyfour
hours, whilst even those out in the Western Approaches would be able
to get there within a couple of days. For Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, it was
a ridiculous suggestion. The 59-year-old veteran of Gallipoli and Jutland
was a hugely experienced sailor who had commanded destroyer flotillas
and battle squadrons, held senior staff positions at the Admiralty and with
the Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets, before being made C-in-C Home
Fleet in 1938. Modest and unassuming, with a dry sense of humour, he was
enormously popular with those who served under him. He was utterly
imperturbable, never known to be rattled, and his calm, pragmatic mind was
able to work through a number of myriad difficulties, whilst always
maintaining a very clear sense of proportion. Charming and possessed of
sound judgement he may have been, yet Forbes was not a man afraid to
speak his mind, nor to stand up to his superiors if he believed they were
wrong.
And he certainly believed Pound was wrong over the disposition of the
Fleet. While others in London were awed by the German successes on the
Continent, Forbes, from his cabin aboard HMS Nelson at Scapa Flow, was
able to stand back and view matters slightly more logically. To him, an
imminent invasion seemed unlikely. Germany had not yet won air
superiority, which he considered a prerequisite for invasion, nor did the
Germans appear to have anything like the number of surface vessels for
such an operation. British experience in Norway showed how hard it was to
transport and maintain a force without control of the air. Of course, he
argued, it was always possible the Germans might be foolish enough to
mount an invasion anyway. ‘If so,’ he wrote to Pound, ‘we should welcome
the attempt as being an excellent opportunity to inflict a defeat on the
enemy, but we should not deflect our forces and energies into purely