The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

well; indeed, many were friends. ‘You are charged with one of the most
disagreeable and difficult tasks that a British Admiral has ever been faced
with,’ came the message from the Admiralty, ‘but we have complete
confidence in you and rely on you to carry it out relentlessly.’ In the early
hours of 2 July, Somerville sent his ultimatum, which despite repeated
appeals and negotiations was rejected. Thus, at 5.54 p.m. on 3 July,
Somerville’s ships opened fire. One French battleship blew up, another ran
aground and a further battleship was beached. One cruiser escaped to
Toulon, albeit damaged, as did those at Algiers. A few days later, the huge
battleship Richelieu, at Dakar, was also put out of action. Over 1,200
French sailors, who just a couple of weeks before had been allies and
comrades in arms, lost their lives.
When Churchill told Parliament what had been done, tears had streamed
down his cheeks. On 5 July, Vichy France formally broke off relations with
Britain. The sinking of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kébir was a tragedy, but
had, in a stroke, eliminated a serious threat. More than that, it showed the
world that Britain had no intention of rolling over.
Group Captain Tommy Elmhirst and his colleagues on the Joint Intelligence
Sub-Committee had been busy trying to collate and interpret intelligence
regarding Germany’s intentions. On 4 July, they submitted their latest
appreciation, concluding that Germany was indeed preparing an invasion.
There were reports of large-scale landing exercises, troop-carrying aircraft
had been moved from training schools to front-line duties, aerial
photographs suggested large numbers of rafts were being built at Kiel; divebombing
units were being concentrated in Holland and north-east France.
So it went on – a long list of compelling evidence that suggested invasion
was imminent, although ‘unlikely to take place before the middle of July’.
Meanwhile, General Ironside, C-in-C Home Forces, had been putting
together his own plan for the defence of Britain, which included more antiinvasion
obstacles, anti-tank obstacles, and a ‘crust’ of troops protecting the
coast with mobile reserves inland. ‘In general, I find myself in agreement
with the Commander-in-Chief’s plan,’ noted Churchill, then added, ‘Until
the Air Force is worn down by prolonged air fighting and destruction of
aircraft supply, the power of the Navy remains decisive against any serious
invasion.’