The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

Churchill, however, was the army’s defensive outlook. It had been trained
to be defensive, which was one of the reasons there were so few tanks, for
example. Yet the Prime Minister firmly believed that a defensive mindset
was not the way forward. He had been much impressed by the Germans’
offensive approach and wanted the British army to take a leaf out of their
book. He suggested, for example, the creation of ‘Storm Troops’ or
‘Leopards’ as he fancifully termed them, who were trained to pounce within
four hours on any place that should need them.
When General Ironside, GOC Home Forces, had first been given the
thorny task of how best to prepare for invasion with large numbers of badly
equipped men, his solution was to combine what few mobile units he had
with static defences over a wide area. Inland, from Bristol, south around
London then all the way to Richmond in North Yorkshire was what he
called the GHQ Line. Making the most of natural obstacles such as rivers
and escarpments, this would be lined with pillboxes and other defences. The
idea was that troops around the coast would be able to hold off the enemy
long enough until mobile troops could fall in behind the GHQ Line. It was
unquestionably a defensive plan that was designed to make the best of a bad
job. After all, infantry without guns or transport could not be expected to
achieve much.
The Vice-Chiefs of Staff had criticized Ironside’s strategy because to
them it seemed crazy to make no real effort to halt the enemy until half the
country had already been overrun. Churchill was equally critical because he
felt that the army now had enough equipment to be able to put up a decent
show, particularly if those involved were imbibed with enough offensive
spirit. Rapid, resolute engagement was what he wanted; the defence of a
stretch of the coast, he believed, should be measured not by the number of
troops immediately available, but by the speed in which a counter-attack
could be mounted.
On 20 July, Ironside was sacked for the second time since Churchill had
taken over. This was hard on Ironside, but the right decision; he was out of
date, a relic from a different age. Brooke took his place, with a firm remit
for a more offensive outlook to Britain’s land defences. But as he had noted
during the PM’s visit on 17 July, Churchill had other plans as to how to take
the attack to the enemy. Prime amongst these was what Churchill called
‘ungentlemanly warfare’. The seeds of Churchill’s thinking may have been
sown with the idea of an Allied redoubt in Brittany, but at the same time