The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

regime, Göring was always able to use political, military and industrial
espionage to keep one step ahead.
Whilst building his industrial and economic empire, he was also
developing the Luftwaffe, which, by May 1940, contained the majority of
Germany’s anti-aircraft forces as well as the Fallschirmjäger units – the
airborne forces. Thus in addition to his economic and political interests, he
also had a considerable number of air and land forces under his command.
No other Nazi combined political and military power to such a degree.
Ironically, however, despite his military background, Göring was not
particularly militarily minded – strategically or operationally so at any rate.
His enormously forceful personality, and popularity in the early days of the
Third Reich, had enabled him to attract the best men from both army and
civil life into his fledgling air force. As the most powerful economic figure
in Germany, he had also ensured that the Luftwaffe did not want for money.
Indeed, its exponential expansion in just a few short years was an
astonishing achievement. Persuasive, and infectiously optimistic, he truly
believed that almost anything could be achieved. Yet his optimism often led
him to ignore unpalatable truths, while his divide and rule policy for
keeping his Luftwaffe General Staff in line – a feature of the Nazi regime –
frequently proved itself to be counter-productive.
It is unlikely, for example, that as Göring boarded Asia on the morning
of 10 May to meet his Luftwaffe commanders, he would have wanted to
know the real state of the Luftwaffe’s forces as the western offensive began.
Dressed this morning in one of his specially designed summer white
uniforms, his fingers bedecked with rings, he set out for the Air Staff’s
Permanent Headquarters at Kurfürst just outside the capital in a confident
yet anxious mood. On paper, his Luftwaffe had an effective strength of
some 5,446 aircraft. But strength on paper is not the same as actual
strength, and actual strength is not the same as operational strength. For
example, the third wing of the bomber group KG 4, in which Oberleutnant
Hajo Herrmann commanded a Staffel, had an actual strength of thirty-five
Junkers 88 bombers, but eight of those were not fit or ready for action. This
was nothing unusual. Barely a single Luftwaffe unit could fly all the aircraft
lined up at their respective airfields along the German borders that morning.
Furthermore, out of the actual strength available to the Luftwaffe, a number
were held back for home defence or were on service in Norway. What this
meant was that, as the attack began, Göring had two Luftflotten available