The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

of taking the attack to England, JG 2 had been ordered on to the defensive.
For the pilots it meant one day on, one day off. ‘That is why one day,’ he
noted, ‘I get up at 4.15 a.m., and sit from five until 2230, then go to bed at
2300. The next day I get up at 9 a.m. and have almost nothing to do.’ The
next day, he wrote: ‘General situation: no-one knows anything!’
Göring had, in fact, on the last day of June, issued his ‘General
Directive for the Operation of the Luftwaffe against England’. Three
Luftflotten were to be used, 2 and 3, as in the western campaign, but also 5
Luftflotte in Norway. The attack would begin just as soon as the new
disposition of forces had been completed. The problem was that to attack
Britain the Luftwaffe needed as many fighters, with their low range, as
close to the coast as possible, which meant creating a large number of new
airfields. Since a cleared field was sufficient for taking off and landing, this
in itself was not much of a problem. Nor was finding billets, which could be
requisitioned from the French at the click of an adjutant’s fingers. More
problematic was setting up the groundcrews, complete with spares, tools
and other requirements, and establishing smooth lines of supply. Of equal
importance to Göring was establishing anti-aircraft defences and sufficient
defences for each of these new airfields. The campaign by the RAF’s
Bomber Command had not caused serious damage yet, but it had never
once paused. In the first week of July, Bomber Command had flown
thirteen separate missions to Germany, Holland and Belgium, including a
number of attacks on coastal airfields; considerably more British bombers
were over German territory than German bombers were over British. These
were proving a considerable nuisance that was beginning to get on the
nerves of the German command. Göring certainly expected British bombers
to step up their campaign the moment the Luftwaffe started theirs. Hitler’s
indecisiveness was one reason for the continued pause in operations, but
another important one was his determination to make sure his Luftwaffe
was fully ready. ‘The intensified attacks against the enemy air force can be
ordered very soon,’ he said on 21 July. ‘Until then, careful preparations,
maintenance and improvements of personnel and material readiness for
battle should continue.’ Göring and his Luftwaffe might have been
outwardly confident, but they clearly shared Hitler’s twitchiness too.
Bomber Command had already played a crucial role in the battle to come.
Nonetheless, Göring had spelled out his aims in his directive. All three
air fleets were to be given dates and targets simultaneously so that the