The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

shirked his new responsibilities. This was in large part due to his intense
sense of public duty, but Churchill had also played his role, making it clear
how much he depended upon Chamberlain and acting towards him with
extreme graciousness.
The first War Cabinet that day was at 11.30 a.m. at Downing Street. To
begin with reports were read out from France, which was followed by a
discussion about what to tell the Dominions; it was well known that the
Australian High Commissioner, for example, was a defeatist. Things were
also still bleak in Norway. Not only had the British suffered a humiliating
defeat in Central Norway, but it now seemed as though they would have to
evacuate Narvik, which had been captured by a combined Anglo-French-
Polish force two days before; it had been the only land success during the
entire campaign, but, it now seemed, all for nought. Then Chamberlain gave
an appraisal of the Chiefs of Staffs’ ‘A Certain Eventuality’, pointing out
that much depended on the United States. ‘This was perhaps not an
unjustifiable assumption,’ he said, ‘but we might not obtain this support in
the immediate future.’ This, as Churchill well knew, was true enough. The
Prime Minister did, however, know that the aide-memoire was being
discussed, questioning Group Captain Tommy Elmhirst’s figures for
Luftwaffe strength. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir
Richard Pierse, had been asked to produce new, more accurate figures,
which he now presented. These showed a ratio of 2.5:1 in favour of the
Germans, rather than 4:1, as in the aide-memoire. It still meant British
airmen would have to shoot down three German aircraft for every one of
their own that was destroyed. Halifax said little at this time. The mood in
the Cabinet Room that morning was gloomy, to put it mildly.
The War Cabinet met again at 4.30 p.m. and this time it began with
Halifax reading out his draft letter to Mussolini. Churchill then said he
thought it would be better for Roosevelt to approach Italy rather than the
British with the French. He suggested that, should France collapse,
Germany might well give her good terms but she would have to be
governed by men acceptable to the Germans. In other words, France would
effectively become pro-German and anti-British. Chamberlain agreed,
although he was still largely with Halifax and said that until France
collapsed then Britain should go along with the approach to Mussolini so as
not to let them down completely.