The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

the German fighter airfields of Guines, Caffiers and Coquelles amongst
others. Arthur, however, was unable to find his targets, first because of low
cloud, and then, when that cleared, because of high cloud hiding the moon.
At least for a change, no-one was hit.
Such tactical debate underlined just how new this type of warfare was. Both
sides were feeling their way. Necessity is the mother of invention and
onboard radar and increasingly sophisticated bombsights were being
developed, but they were not in widespread use in the summer of 1940. It
was perhaps odd, though, that Göring, a former fighter pilot, should have
been such a proponent of Douhet and the theory that the bomber is the
principal tool in air warfare, especially when he had such a fine fighter
force at his disposal.
As it was, by the latter end of August, many of the fighter units were
beginning to feel decidedly underappreciated and frustrated at being made
to operate with what they instinctively knew were the wrong tactics. At the
smaller tactical level, the German fighter pilots had, with the pairs system
and finger-four, developed a combat formation that has been used by air
forces around the world ever since. Culturally, Luftwaffe pilots were also
more open to discussion and debate than their British counterparts, who,
after a hard day’s fighting, tended to head to the mess or pub, where talking
shop was not really on the agenda. Hajo Herrmann, for example, used to
regularly write up papers on his theories of how bombing should be
conducted, and, although he would not deny himself the odd glass of wine,
spent most of his evenings in contemplative study. In I/JG 52, there was
also much tactical discussion amongst the pilots. After supper, usually eaten
in and around their bell-tents, they would then sit and talk, albeit with some
of the wine retrieved from Calais harbour to loosen the throat. ‘All of the
pilots, NCOs and officers would gather,’ noted Ulrich Steinhilper, ‘and
lively discussions would usually ensue. These were generally toned by the
events of the day; losses would quieten us down and bring a mood of
introspection, whereas success would bring with it a surplus of energy and
excitement.’
They were all angry about the new rules with regard to bomber escort.
Ulrich believed, rightly, that the Me 109s should try and destroy the RAF
fighters not only in the air but also on the ground. On 19 August, his Staffel
had carried out a ground attack on Manston. His heart had been hammering