The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

Rundstedt, a conservative, agreed with von Kluge, and issued an order at 8
p.m. on the 23rd that the following day the panzers were to interrupt their
advances for twenty-four hours while the infantry caught up. Most of the
divisions already attacking the Canal Line were furious. Guderian’s 1st
Panzer largely ignored this order, however. After all, had he listened to the
orders of von Kleist and von Rundstedt so far, they would have been yet to
reach the coast.
Hitler would not have become involved, however, had Halder and von
Brauchitsch not now become embroiled as well. Annoyed by von
Rundstedt’s decision, Halder came to the conclusion that Army Group A
had become too unwieldy – it was now seventy-one divisions strong; ‘I
have a good idea,’ he noted, ‘its staff has not been energetic and active
enough.’ As a result, von Brauchitsch now issued an order that as of 8 p.m.
on 24th May, the whole of Fourth Army, including all the panzers, would
switch to the command of Army Group B, whose task it would be to finish
the encirclement in the north, while Army Group A henceforth concentrated
on confronting French forces to the south.
Needless to say, von Rundstedt took exception to this order and, when
Hitler visited him the next day, made his disgruntlement clear. It was,
however, the first Hitler had known about it: the decision had been taken by
von Brauchitsch without his knowledge. Annoyed that such an important
order had been issued without his say-so, Hitler immediately rescinded it
and then confirmed von Rundstedt’s close-up order of the previous evening.
The order prompted immediate and sustained outrage from nearly every
single commander now pressing the Canal Line, as well as from Halder,
whose plans were being badly compromised. Oberstleutnant Ulrich Liss,
one of Halder’s staff officers, saw his boss at the briefing that night. ‘He
was livid with anger,’ noted Liss, ‘such as I have never seen him before.’
Their anger was justified. It was the southern British front that was
vulnerable: the British left flank was now dug in along the border making
the most of previously prepared defences and in good order. Along the right
flank it was a different story altogether, and it was here that Halder’s main
strike force – his mobile forces – were now massing for their final strike.
Yet more than that, it was abundantly clear that neither the British nor
French were in any position to make a major counterattack. German
reconnaissance planes could sweep over the enemy corridor at will; the
chaos within this pocket would have been all too apparent. And just where