The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

on the point of collapse. That was still a very long way off, but it
represented an important psychological chink of light.
Germany’s premature economic collapse was a line even Ambassador
Joe Kennedy believed. As he pointed out in a letter to his youngest son,
Bobby, there were millions of people in Nazi-occupied Europe who might
well find it difficult to get enough food during the next winter. ‘And when
people are starving,’ he wrote, ‘there is no limit to what they will do.’
Kennedy remained sceptical about Britain’s chances, however. With
little access to Churchill, Beaverbrook had become his closest source, and
told the Ambassador that Churchill believed that if they could get over the
summer months, then the crisis would have passed. Beaverbrook confided
to Kennedy that he now felt even more optimistic than that. More than just
resisting invasion, he was beginning to feel that the RAF might be able to
‘overcome’ the Luftwaffe. ‘I thought this optimism,’ noted Kennedy, ‘was a
clever attempt to enlist more active United States support, and Beaverbrook
admitted that they were doing an about-face to make their situation look as
bright as possible.’
Kennedy might have been suspicious about this upbeat new line, but
Raymond Lee believed Britain now had a real chance of holding out.
Thanks to his earlier time as attaché, Raymond was already a well-known
and popular figure amongst Britain’s military hierarchy, and consequently
found many doors open to him. In fact, he was often given greater access
than Kennedy, and furthermore had a greater understanding of military
matters. Like everyone, he was sure Hitler’s all-out attack would begin any
moment. ‘I also believe,’ he added sagaciously, ‘that if he is not successful
by the fifteenth of September, he will never be.’
Raymond’s more positive reports were certainly a marked contrast with
those of the Ambassador. ‘I send plenty of cables home,’ he jotted in his
diary, ‘in which I call ’em as I see ’em.’ This had not gone unnoticed and
coincided with Roosevelt’s suspicions about Kennedy’s judgement.
Deciding he needed an independent opinion, the President sent to Britain
one of his trusted old friends, Colonel William ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan, and
the journalist Edgar Ansel Mowrer, to assess Britain’s chances. Kennedy
was incensed. Not only had he not been consulted, but his protests when he
learned what was afoot had been ignored. Then, when Donovan and
Mowrer did finally arrive on 20 July, Donovan persisted with the charade
that he was there to try and understand how Britain’s conscription law