The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

was to let Britain stew, and then make her a peace offer which she would be
mad not to accept.
He was still grappling with what to do when Count Ciano visited him in
Berlin on 7 July. Ciano found Hitler in a kindly mood, still flushed with
success. The Führer told Ciano that he was inclined to continue the struggle
and promised to unleash ‘a storm of wrath and steel’ upon the British. ‘But
the final decision has not been reached,’ jotted Ciano, ‘and it is for this
reason that he is delaying his speech.’
In the meantime, General Jodl, Chief of Operations at OKW, had issued
an appreciation of the situation. Although he regarded Britain’s position as
hopeless and assumed she would come to her senses, he proposed a series
of options should she stubbornly insist on battling it out. First and foremost
was the destruction of the RAF, but combined with this was the strangling
of Britain’s war economy, terror bombing raids, and then a landing, which
he viewed as being the death blow. He also suggested wider action such as
the capture of Gibraltar in co-operation with Spain, and the Suez Canal with
the Italians. ‘Discuss basis for warfare against England,’ noted Halder on 1
July. ‘Prerequisite is air superiority.’ Then he added what his superiors were
also thinking, ‘which might make landing unnecessary.’ Britain might have
been an island, but the strategy of knocking out the enemy’s air force first,
then sending in the army, had worked so far in the war, and was now the
basis of Jodl’s plans too.
In fact, Göring had already ordered a few raids over Britain. Hajo
Herrmann and KG 4, for example, had been dropping mines at the mouths
of British harbours, while raiders had attacked airfields in Britain for three
nights from 5 June, then industrial works for two more nights on 18 and 19
June. None of these light attacks had caused much damage, however.
Certainly there had been no sustained effort, no wholehearted commitment,
against Britain yet.
That was fine by Göring, who felt no burning sense of urgency to
launch an all-out air assault on Britain. Like the Führer, he remained
convinced that the British would see the light and sue for peace. In any
case, following the end in France, there was much reorganization to be
done. Units needed to move up to the north-east, others needed to be rested.
Supply chains needed to be established. Some of the losses suffered since
10 May had to be made good. Aircraft needed to be repaired and new
models sent to their Gruppen. Should Britain insist on fighting on, then at