The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

One person who was certainly taking a pretty dim view of the mayhem the
Hurricane squadrons were facing in France was Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh
Dowding. On 14 May, the Commander of RAF Fighter Command had
outlined his views on whether a strategic bombing campaign against
Germany should begin. In a letter to the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, he
made it clear that he thought it was the soundest of plans and that any
operation that could undermine the Luftwaffe was worth trying. ‘I want the
Fighter Command to pull its full weight in this battle,’ he added at the end
of the letter, ‘but I want it to do so by shooting down Germans in this
country and not by being used as a reservoir for sending reinforcements to
France.’ At the time of writing, Dowding did not know that Reynaud, the
French Prime Minister, had already asked for a further ten fighter
squadrons, but he had got wind of the request before the day was out.
Tearing his hair out with frustration, he asked to be allowed to state his case
before the War Cabinet. This was granted.
Thus at the same War Cabinet meeting in which Bomber Command
were given the go-ahead to attack the Ruhr, Dowding was able to speak
lucidly and rationally, and make a convincing argument for not giving in to
Reynaud’s demands. Churchill and the Cabinet agreed: for the present, no
more squadrons would go to France.
A day later, however, when the full scale of the collapse of the Meuse
front had become clear, the French once again appealed for ten more fighter
squadrons, recognizing that while Britain could offer little more in terms of
ground troops, it still had the bulk of Fighter Command in England, as far
as they were concerned, doing nothing. ‘If they do not come,’ warned
Gamelin, ‘the battle would be lost.’ Gamelin was talking nonsense. Ten
fighter squadrons were not going to make the difference between French
collapse and a dramatic Allied recovery. Air Marshal Barratt and Lord Gort,
both on the spot in France, also demanded more fighters be sent, and, in the
face of logic, Ironside, Ismay and Pound on the Chiefs of Staff Committee
supported the request.
So too did Churchill, whose affection for France and the French ran
very deep indeed. He recognized that sending any fighters would be a grave
risk but felt it was essential to do something that might chivvy French
morale and which would give them a chance to recover their composure in
the face of the German onslaught.