The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

effective attacks had been by a lone Junkers 88 on Middle Wallop on 14
August, because it had dropped its bombs from a very low height. Moments
later, however, it had been shot down. Therein lay the crux of the problem:
accurate bombing was extremely risky.
What all this showed was that precision bombing was not really
possible. If the Luftwaffe wanted ‘bombs on England’ to make an impact, it
needed to forget its obsession with precision bombing and send over
massed formations instead, at night when the fighters were not around, and
carpet-bomb whatever target it was going for with as many bombs as it
could possibly drop. If it dropped enough, some would inevitably hit their
mark. Then Knickebein and X-Gerät would prove their worth.
Of course, had Göring really wanted someone to blame, he could have
first pointed the finger at his own General Staff, and then turned on his
intelligence men, particularly Oberst Beppo Schmid. Not only had Beppo
given him a completely false picture of RAF strength, but he had led the
Luftwaffe commanders to expend invaluable numbers of men, aircraft and
bombs on targets that made no impact on Fighter Command’s ability to
function. On 18 August, the four principal targets had been Croydon,
Thorney Island, Ford and Poling. Croydon was justified as it was a fighter
airfield in 11 Group, albeit not a sector station. Thorney Island, on the other
hand, was Coastal Command, while Ford was Fleet Air Arm. Poling was an
RDF station and was knocked out, although emergency mobile radar was
installed later that day. Of the twenty-one biggest attacks on airfields and
RDF stations since 13 August, nine, or just over 40 per cent, were nothing
to do with Fighter Command. It is not entirely clear whether Schmid and
the Luftwaffe High Command were aware they were frequently hitting nonfighter
airfields, or whether they were consciously going for bomber and
naval airfields as well as part of their attempt to destroy the RAF as a
whole. However, at Göring’s conference on 21 July, he had made it clear
that the RAF’s fighters were to be destroyed first before attacks on ‘bomber
formations’ could begin. Whatever the truth, it was still a mistake.
The Reichsmarschall had hoped that a pep talk, combined with the
appointment of some younger fighter commanders, and closer cooperation
between fighter and bomber units – he demanded more telephones for his
commanders – would give his Luftwaffe the impetus to now finish the job.
‘We have reached the decisive period of the air war against England,’ he
told his assembled commanders. ‘The vital task is to turn all means at our