The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

were all more or less now in line with one another. Guderian’s 10th Panzer
protected his southern flank along the River Aisne, while 1st and 2nd
Panzer were poised to burst their way towards Amiens and Albert the
following day. To the north Reinhardt’s 8th Panzer Division had heroically
made its way through the gridlock of the Ardennes and had caught up with
6th Panzer, while to the north of Rommel at Cambrai were 5th Panzer and
3rd and 4th from Army Group B. Furthermore, hot on Rommel’s tails was
the Waffen-SS Totenkopf Division. While most Wehrmacht infantry
divisions barely had a couple of trucks to rub together, the Nazi military
arm could pull all manner of strings that enabled inexperienced units like
the Totenkopf to already be one of the best-equipped divisions in the entire
German army. Placed under the direct command of Rommel, its resources
were much needed at this latest critical moment in the battle.
Suddenly, the mad, frenetic panzer rush west was beginning to become
a more solid, unified front, and thanks to their superior communications, the
Germans were able to co-ordinate their actions and strengthen their line
swiftly and efficiently. There were still isolated pockets of French resistance
behind in the wake of the German advance but as the infantry began
pouring out of the Ardennes, these were rapidly being mopped up. By dawn
on the 20th, the Allies’ chances of counterattacking and successfully
plugging the now gaping-wide gap were slipping away with every passing
hour. They needed to act, and act fast.
By 19 May, there were only thirty-seven squadrons in Fighter Command
ready for battle compared with the minimum of sixty that were required
were the Luftwaffe to attack Britain in strength. This was some shortfall.
Still, a corner had been turned, which was a great relief to Newall and
Dowding: now that Gort was thinking in terms of evacuation, plans were
put in place to get most of the RAF Component back to England too. No
doubt Dowding and Newall’s stark warning had made an impression, but it
was the reality of the unfolding disaster that spoke louder than words. Thus
the Prime Minister finally accepted that to send good after bad to France
was a futile exercise. That same day, he sent a memo to Ismay ordering that
no more fighters be sent to France but warning that, should it be necessary
to evacuate the BEF, then a strong covering force would be needed from
English bases. With this note, Churchill was reversing a trend that had
placed Fighter Command in deadly peril since the outset. Instead of