The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

intercept service we know that their orders are strictly to attack our
bombers. Yesterday, these tactics took us by surprise.’
‘That’s just what we want,’ Göring replied. ‘If they come at us in
droves, we can shoot them down in droves!’
Once again, German intelligence was faulty. The arrival on the scene of
the Duxford Wing was certainly something new, but Fighter Command was
by no means purely attacking the bombers. The latest assessment of enemy
strength was another piece of fiction from Oberst Schmid. He reported that
the RAF had begun the previous day with 288 fighters, and that morning
with just 177. In fact, Fighter Command began the day with 659 serviceable
aircraft ready to take to the skies. ‘Göring believes the English are gathering
their last forces,’ noted Milch. It was the same story the Luftwaffe High
Command had been peddling all month: all that was needed was one last
push; victory, they felt sure, was tantalizingly within reach. The fighters, it
was agreed, were to be reinforced with eight Staffeln from other areas and
VIII Fliegerkorps was to transfer to Luftflotte 2; new instructions were
issued. From now on, Luftflotte 2 was to attack British fighters during the
day and London at night; Luftflotte 3 was to assault Southampton during
the day and London by night. Meanwhile, 9th Fliegerdivision, which
included Hajo Herrmann and KG 4, was to continue nuisance raids on
London, and to begin dropping aerial mines on the capital.
It showed just how woolly Luftwaffe thinking had become. What had
been the point of attacking London two times the day before? Just what
were they trying to achieve? The subjugation of the British people or the
destruction of the RAF? Why had Jafü 3 been sent back to Normandy when
it would have been better to concentrate forces against England in the
south-east, where the distance across the Channel was smaller? How could
they have recognized this at the end of August and forgotten it two weeks
later? And why Southampton? It seems that no-one was really sure.
Operationally, the Luftwaffe was in a mess, short of aircraft and lacking the
infrastructure needed to continue a battle of this intensity. Tactically, the
thinking was faulty, as the High Command failed to use either bombers or
fighters to their best capabilities. Operationally, it was struggling. And
strategically, it had lost sight of what it was supposed to be achieving.
Believing the German air force was within sight of victory was a fool’s
dream. The Luftwaffe was not on the verge of triumph; rather, it was further
away than ever.