The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

‘well-developed defence forces of the enemy can be split and be faced with
the maximum forms of attack’. First, he wanted to draw out smaller enemy
formations and, with reconnaissance, firmly establish the strength and
grouping of Fighter Command. This done, primary targets would then be
the enemy air force, its ground organizations and its industry, but they
would also concentrate on harbours and installations, merchant and naval
shipping, and so sever Britain’s lifelines.
‘As long as the enemy air force is not defeated,’ he concluded, ‘the
prime requirement for the air war is to attack the enemy air force at every
possible opportunity by day or by night, in the air or on the ground, without
consideration of other tasks.’
Luftwaffe squadrons, despite the losses suffered in the western campaign,
now had plenty of experience to share around. Broadly, their tactics had
been proved, and most pilots and crew believed they had aircraft that were
better than those of their opponents. Confidence was high, as well it might
have been. Ever since Spain, it had been one-way traffic with the Luftwaffe.
Although the word ‘panzer’ now held connotations of military invincibility,
it was the German air force, above all, that was still perceived around the
world to be its most terrifying weapon. Certainly, the Luftwaffe had more
than played its part in the great victories to date.
General Milch spent a great deal of his time hurrying from one
Geschwader to another, talking to the pilots and commanders. So, too, did
Kesselring; they understood the importance of listening to the views of the
men in the firing line. There were few concerns. The Spitfire had been
recognized as a formidable opponent, but the failure at Dunkirk had been
largely explained away by the weather. It had been bad luck, that was all. In
terms of equipment, and tactically and operationally, most pilots believed
they were well served. ‘The campaign had gone so well in our favour,’
noted Ulrich Steinhilper, ‘that there had been no need for complex tactical
analyses and instructions.’
Yet the reason pilots such as Siegfried Bethke were sometimes spending
all day at cockpit readiness – that is, sitting in their 109s waiting to be sent
into action at a moment’s notice – was because the Luftwaffe had not set up
their sophisticated DeTe – radar – technology to support their front-line
pilots. Nor were pilots supported by any air-to-ground radio telegraphy or
Direction Finding system. Luftwaffe pilots and aircrew could communicate