The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

watching the giant raids over southern England, the Luftwaffe was not big
enough to do what it set out to achieve. Nor was the U-boat force. A
staggering 352,407 tons of Allied shipping were lost to the U-boats in
October – the highest toll so far. It would not always be so easy; once the
Home Fleet was released from anti-invasion duty and once the Royal Navy
grew some more, the convoys would be better protected. Yet what an
opportunity had been missed. If between nine and fourteen submarines
could wreak that much havoc, what would fifty or a hundred have done?
Churchill was worried enough as it was. Had Dönitz had the boats he had
been earlier promised then perhaps Britain might have been brought to her
knees. Massed U-boat attacks combined with a more sensibly handled air
battle could have been devastating.
The truth was that the crushing victory in France hid many of
Germany’s deficiencies. Hitler was lucky to have had such inspired
commanders in men like Guderian and, frankly, even Halder, who
understood the potential of modern mobile warfare and the principles of
concentration of force. The western campaign had come off in lightningquick
fashion because of the genius and vision of a few men and the high
training of a key proportion of the army. Contributing to that success was
the Luftwaffe, a large aerial force that had developed tactics and methods of
directly supporting the ground troops in a way that no other nation had
considered at that time. And it succeeded because the French crumbled so
badly. Operationally, tactically and strategically, the French had been
woeful. Their leadership was too old, too dated. Morale was poor and they
made lots and lots of really bad mistakes. On paper, Germany should never
have won.
It must have seemed, in June 1940, that momentum alone would force
victory over Britain. Hitler never knew how close he was to achieving his
goal in the last days of May, but the halt order was the first of many missed
opportunities that summer. From Dunkirk onwards, when the Luftwaffe’s
shortcomings were first exposed, the Germans made a catalogue of
mistakes. Hitler prevaricated too long, they had no clear strategy, and they
constantly, persistently, depended on incredibly faulty intelligence; the
roguish Beppo Schmid had a lot to answer for. At no point did they ever
have a clear picture of Fighter Command’s strength or an understanding of
the Dowding System. They also singularly failed to exploit the strengths of
what resources they did have. The handling of the fighter arm, for example,