The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

them they were about to throw in the towel, he made it clear that the writing
was on the wall. He personally would never sue for peace but a time might
come when he was forced to resign; he now told Churchill about the depth
of Pétain’s and Weygand’s defeatism. Even Reynaud admitted the war
could no longer be won on land. Churchill told him that as soon as the north
of France was cleared up the Germans would not turn south but
immediately begin attacking Britain. Reynaud disagreed. ‘The dream of all
Germans,’ he said, ‘was to conquer Paris.’
‘Whatever happens,’ Churchill replied, ‘we are not prepared to give in.
We would rather go down fighting than be enslaved to Germany.’
Reynaud now remained at Admiralty House while Churchill returned to
Downing Street for the second War Cabinet of the day. Now, at the second
Cabinet, Halifax was more bullish. Since the morning session, all had read
the Chiefs of Staffs’ aide-memoire, in which the following scenario was
envisaged: most of the BEF lost, France making peace with Germany, Italy
entering the war, and Europe, from Norway to North Africa, either in
German hands or under German domination. Britain could still hold out, but
only if the United States gave full financial and material support, and if the
Royal Navy and RAF managed to maintain a control over and around the
country. At the back, in an appendix, were Tommy Elmhirst’s estimates of
Luftwaffe strength and that of the RAF. On 17 May, the RAF had just 491
fighters, including obsolescent Defiants. In contrast, he believed the
Luftwaffe still had some 4,500 aircraft. Naval comparisons were more
favourable: 319 of all types of ships for the Royal Navy compared with
around a hundred for the Kriegsmarine. However, the Italian navy had some
400 vessels of all kinds, which then rather redressed the balance should the
Italians come in with Germany, as it looked certain they would.
It was sobering stuff, and understandable that Halifax, for one, believed
they were staring down the barrel. Their survival depended on so many ifs –
‘eventualities’ – that could in no way be even remotely guaranteed.
Churchill had always been something of a warmonger; how could his
judgement be trusted at this darkest hour?
Halifax now stated that he favoured an approach to Italy; Churchill said
he doubted much would come of it but agreed that perhaps the War Cabinet
should consider it. Soon after, the meeting broke up and Halifax left to see
Reynaud at Admiralty House and to discuss the possible buying off of
Mussolini. Churchill and the rest of the War Cabinet followed some ten