The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

however, poor weather once again prevented the kind of full-scale daylight
operations the Luftwaffe needed. Nonetheless, on the 13th, Hitler was still
optimistic. Reports on British morale being fed back by the German
military attaché in Washington suggested English morale was crumbling
under the weight of the air attacks. At OKW operations, it was rumoured
that Hitler believed a revolution in Britain was about to erupt. Luftwaffe
reports also suggested that fighter superiority had by now almost been
achieved. The directive for SEALION had also been drawn up and handed
to Jodl. Everything was ready to go; Hitler only needed to give the word.
On the 13th, he seemed to be placing his hopes on defeating Britain
through continued air assault and internal revolution to bring about victory,
but the next – decision – day, he seemed more inclined to go ahead once
more. ‘A successful landing followed by an occupation,’ he said, ‘would
end the war in a short time.’ This, of course, was exactly what everyone in
the Reich wanted. The temptation, therefore, to go ahead with one last final
gamble must have been huge. But still, even a gambler like Hitler
recognized that one prerequisite above all remained: air superiority, and
however encouraging the signs, they still did not quite have it. ‘Four to five
days of good weather are required to achieve decisive results,’ Hitler told a
conference of his commanders on 14 September. ‘There is a great chance of
defeating the British; already the effect up to now has been enormous.’ Just
one last push was needed – a maximum effort and some sunshine.
Operation SEALION was not to be abandoned yet.
Despite a misty, hazy start, Sunday, 15 September, promised to develop into
a fine day, ideal conditions for the Luftwaffe to begin to deliver its coup de
grâce on the RAF. The problem for Kesselring was that his maximum effort
was not as impressive as it had been a month earlier. Leading the way for
the first big raid of the day were only around forty Dorniers drawn from KG
76 and KG 3. Leading the formation was III/KG 76, which had only
nineteen aircraft left in the Gruppe; the first Gruppe had even fewer – just
eight. Kesselring also now had fewer fighters to call on since most of Jafü 3
had returned to Normandy, part of the increasingly confused tactical
thinking of the High Command. A number of replacement aircraft over the
past week had eased the aircraft shortage a bit, but even so Jafü 2 was well
below its establishment of around 600 aircraft; certainly, Kesselring could
not call on much more than around 400 Me 109s and a hundred Zerstörers.