The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

Leigh-Mallory had the support of Sholto Douglas and a number of other
highly influential players within the RAF and Air Ministry, men like
Marshal ‘Boom’ Trenchard, long retired but whose views still counted, and
a former Chief of the Air Staff, Sir John Salmond. These were men who had
long wished to see the back of Dowding, and they now sensed their moment
to strike was coming. A coup was being staged, one that would rid them of
both Dowding and Park.
The first bone of contention was Park’s supposed tactical rigidity and
his reluctance to embrace the big wing. Few commanders were more
tactically astute than Park, but in a meeting on 17 October chaired by
Sholto Douglas, and at which Squadron Leader Bader, bizarrely, was
present, he was forced to defend himself against a largely united front of
Douglas and Leigh-Mallory in which it was quite clear they had no
intention of listening to a word he was saying.
The second cause for criticism was over the difficulties of night
interception. Dowding was working on a system in which fighters would
rely entirely on their instruments to fly and would be guided to the target by
radar. This he had reported in a paper, which Churchill had described as
‘masterly’. Many, however, thought this would be impossible, Douglas
included, and that, even if it could be achieved one day, it would take too
long to develop. Amongst those critical of Dowding’s plans were Sir John
Salmond, who had been asked to chair a committee into night defence. It
was not the first time Dowding had been on the receiving end of such
criticism. He had received a copy of Salmond’s report, but had thought little
of it. Certainly, no committee was going to deter him from what he believed
to be the right course.
In all but dismissing Salmond’s report, however, Dowding had made a
big mistake. The man who had instigated Salmond’s committee in the first
place was none other than Lord Beaverbrook, Dowding’s supposed ally. So
he had been, but Beaverbrook, displaying the kind of un-sentimental
ruthlessness that had been a hallmark of his career, had correctly recognized
that night-fighters had now dramatically become the key to Britain’s future
defence against the Luftwaffe. It did not matter that he had the utmost
respect for Dowding and what he had achieved; as far as he was concerned,
the C-in-C Fighter Command was not tackling night defence with the kind
of urgency he felt was needed. This was not true, but Beaverbrook felt the
time had come for a change and a fresh approach. When Dowding saw