The Battle of Britain Five Months That Changed History, May—October 1940 by James Holland (z-lib.org).epub

Yet although the Government was now right behind Churchill in its
determination to continue the fight, it was not so convinced by his belief
that it should still help Britain’s ally, France. Churchill was the man who
had faced the French Comité de Guerre on 31 May, and had witnessed their
desperation. His Francophilia was also deeply felt, but, furthermore, he
worried that if France made a separate peace, Britain might be faced with a
country not just out of the war but with a government actively hostile
towards its former ally. He also knew that the longer the French held out,
the greater the chances of British survival. At that time, it was unclear
whether Germany would try to finish off France or turn straight to Britain,
but if the French made that decision for them by capitulating immediately,
that would not help Britain’s cause. Already, one request after another was
coming from Paris: for more troops, for twenty fighter squadrons, for a joint
appeal to Roosevelt. ‘The French,’ noted Neville Chamberlain, ‘are
hysterical in their demands for assistance for the attack which they expect at
any moment across the Somme.’
Chamberlain was not alone in feeling both weary and wary of the
French. While there was no doubt Weygand, Pétain and others believed the
British had cut and run and left them in the lurch, there was an almost
unanimous feeling amongst Britain’s political and military leadership that
the French had badly let the side down with their feeble response to the
German onslaught, their dithering, and their poor military leadership. The
Cabinet was still fresh from hearing Henry Pownall’s withering view of the
French performance on his return from France when Lord Gort appeared
and took an equally dim view. Everyone could see that France was now a
busted flush. Only Churchill wanted to make an effort to keep them in the
fight.
Not only did he propose sending three divisions via Normandy, but he
also wanted to send over fighter and bomber aircraft, as requested. The
Chiefs of Staff had already urged that no more squadrons be sent to France.
Both Newall and Dowding, attending the War Cabinet, also argued strongly
against such a move. Dowding even produced a graph showing that, on
average, twenty-five Hurricanes a day had been lost in France from 10 to 18
May. Had more squadrons been sent there, he pointed out, there would have
been no Hurricanes left by the end of the month. He told them that if the
Germans launched an attack now, Fighter Command would be able to hold
them for no more than forty-eight hours.